The Wall Street Journal
By JUSTIN LAHARTSeptember 15, 2008;
When Japan was mired in economic crisis, the U.S. urged it to take decisive action to deal with its ailing banks. Japan didn't follow the advice and the crisis dragged on for years. Now, it is the U.S. that is mired in crisis and facing the prospect of swallowing the bitter medicine it once proffered.
Japan's stock-market bubble began rapidly deflating in 1990 and its property bubble followed suit shortly afterward. Many borrowers were unable to make payments on their debt and bad loans piled up on bank balance sheets. A long period of lackluster economic growth made a tough situation worse. With the financial system saddled with bad debts, Japan desperately needed its banks to acknowledge the severity of their problems and for some banks to shut their doors. But the banks, unwilling to take steps that might render them insolvent, refused to acknowledge their problems, extending the crisis.
"One of the lessons we took from Japan was the hesitation and refusal to own up to the problem was a disaster," says University of Chicago Graduate School of Business economist Anil Kashyap.
U.S. financial firms, too, have struggled with owning up to the extent of their credit losses, partly because those losses are a moving target. A year ago, Bear Stearns Cos. was reluctant to sell mortgage-related credit at a loss. That decision came back to haunt the firm as declining home prices continued to pummel mortgages, and Bear ended up in a government-backed fire sale to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive John Thain said in a January interview that the firm's troubles were "for the most part behind us" -- but in July the firm agreed to sell more than $30 billion in mortgage-related assets at a large loss.
Still, U.S. financial firms have been much quicker to acknowledge losses than their Japanese counterparts were. While the slicing and dicing of mortgages into tradable securities played a part in the mortgage mess, accounting rules make it difficult for firms to ignore losses on those securities, says Princeton University economist Hyun Song Shin. In contrast, by continuing to extend credit to bad borrowers, Japanese banks were able to put off recognizing the extent of their debt problems.
"The denial strategy is harder to pull off -- it will catch up to you in the accounting," says Mr. Shin. "That's one of the more encouraging and hopeful signs in the U.S."
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant mortgage companies that the U.S. government seized a week ago, operated under rules that made the extent of their woes much more difficult to assess. But Treasury officials took a tougher line getting Fannie and Freddie to own up to their problems than Japan's Ministry of Finance did with ailing Japanese banks. Just as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has been intent on not repeating the Fed's Depression-era mistakes, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is intent on not repeating Japan's mistakes in the 1990s, says Brad DeLong, an economic historian at the University of California at Berkeley.
One last problem the current U.S. situation shares with Japan in the 1990s may be a financial sector that is far larger than it should be. "If you have an unsustainable lending boom, then by definition the lending has to shrink," says Adam Posen, a deputy director at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
In Japan, that didn't happen. Rather than failing, troubled banks merged with healthier ones. But even though the combined bank would often end up with branches that were within steps of one another, few bank workers lost their jobs. Mr. Posen worries that concerns about the systemic risk to the financial system will prevent the U.S. from allowing enough firms to shut their doors to make the necessary capacity cuts.
In that regard, the tougher line with Wall Street that U.S. officials took over the weekend is encouraging. Refusing to financially backstop a takeover of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. with government money, as they did for J.P. Morgan's hasty acquisition of Bear Stearns, they showed they were far more willing to let a troubled firm fail than their Japanese counterparts were. Also, many financial firms have already begun cutting operations in a way Japanese banks balked at.
But while the U.S. has been decisive where Japan was not, it is worth remembering there was a reason Japan was hesitant to deal with its problems. Recognizing the financial sector's problems quickly increases the possibility of a run for the exits that could seize up the credit markets, putting the overall economy at greater risk. Quickly shrinking the financial sector could have a social cost, as well, putting tens of thousands of people out of work. Where will they go?
By JUSTIN LAHARTSeptember 15, 2008;
When Japan was mired in economic crisis, the U.S. urged it to take decisive action to deal with its ailing banks. Japan didn't follow the advice and the crisis dragged on for years. Now, it is the U.S. that is mired in crisis and facing the prospect of swallowing the bitter medicine it once proffered.
Japan's stock-market bubble began rapidly deflating in 1990 and its property bubble followed suit shortly afterward. Many borrowers were unable to make payments on their debt and bad loans piled up on bank balance sheets. A long period of lackluster economic growth made a tough situation worse. With the financial system saddled with bad debts, Japan desperately needed its banks to acknowledge the severity of their problems and for some banks to shut their doors. But the banks, unwilling to take steps that might render them insolvent, refused to acknowledge their problems, extending the crisis.
"One of the lessons we took from Japan was the hesitation and refusal to own up to the problem was a disaster," says University of Chicago Graduate School of Business economist Anil Kashyap.
U.S. financial firms, too, have struggled with owning up to the extent of their credit losses, partly because those losses are a moving target. A year ago, Bear Stearns Cos. was reluctant to sell mortgage-related credit at a loss. That decision came back to haunt the firm as declining home prices continued to pummel mortgages, and Bear ended up in a government-backed fire sale to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive John Thain said in a January interview that the firm's troubles were "for the most part behind us" -- but in July the firm agreed to sell more than $30 billion in mortgage-related assets at a large loss.
Still, U.S. financial firms have been much quicker to acknowledge losses than their Japanese counterparts were. While the slicing and dicing of mortgages into tradable securities played a part in the mortgage mess, accounting rules make it difficult for firms to ignore losses on those securities, says Princeton University economist Hyun Song Shin. In contrast, by continuing to extend credit to bad borrowers, Japanese banks were able to put off recognizing the extent of their debt problems.
"The denial strategy is harder to pull off -- it will catch up to you in the accounting," says Mr. Shin. "That's one of the more encouraging and hopeful signs in the U.S."
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant mortgage companies that the U.S. government seized a week ago, operated under rules that made the extent of their woes much more difficult to assess. But Treasury officials took a tougher line getting Fannie and Freddie to own up to their problems than Japan's Ministry of Finance did with ailing Japanese banks. Just as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has been intent on not repeating the Fed's Depression-era mistakes, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is intent on not repeating Japan's mistakes in the 1990s, says Brad DeLong, an economic historian at the University of California at Berkeley.
One last problem the current U.S. situation shares with Japan in the 1990s may be a financial sector that is far larger than it should be. "If you have an unsustainable lending boom, then by definition the lending has to shrink," says Adam Posen, a deputy director at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
In Japan, that didn't happen. Rather than failing, troubled banks merged with healthier ones. But even though the combined bank would often end up with branches that were within steps of one another, few bank workers lost their jobs. Mr. Posen worries that concerns about the systemic risk to the financial system will prevent the U.S. from allowing enough firms to shut their doors to make the necessary capacity cuts.
In that regard, the tougher line with Wall Street that U.S. officials took over the weekend is encouraging. Refusing to financially backstop a takeover of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. with government money, as they did for J.P. Morgan's hasty acquisition of Bear Stearns, they showed they were far more willing to let a troubled firm fail than their Japanese counterparts were. Also, many financial firms have already begun cutting operations in a way Japanese banks balked at.
But while the U.S. has been decisive where Japan was not, it is worth remembering there was a reason Japan was hesitant to deal with its problems. Recognizing the financial sector's problems quickly increases the possibility of a run for the exits that could seize up the credit markets, putting the overall economy at greater risk. Quickly shrinking the financial sector could have a social cost, as well, putting tens of thousands of people out of work. Where will they go?
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario