Time for central bankers to take Spanish lessons
By Gillian Tett
Not many banks have emerged from recent events with their reputations intact. Santander might be the exception that proves the rule.
A decade ago the bank was barely known outside Spain’s business community or Latin America. Now it is emerging as one of the more savvy survivors of Europe’s banking storm.
Not only is Santander snapping up cut-price assets (such as the juiciest parts of Bradford & Bingley) but it has also avoided the credit horrors that have triggered the humiliation of so many other mighty European names.
And while that sunny vista might yet change – after all, not even bankers seem truly to know what their banks hold these days – Santander’s run looks doubly remarkable given that Spain is in the aftermath of a property boom.
So what lies behind Santander’s seeming escape? In part, the persona of Emilio Botin, its chief executive, who has a reputation for being extraordinarily shrewd. However, another more interesting issue revolves around the way that Madrid runs its banks.
One key factor protecting Santander from some of the global woes is the tough approach that the Spanish central bank has taken towards regulating its banks in recent years.
Earlier this decade the central bank in essence decided it disliked the idea of banks keeping vast quantities of credit assets off their balance sheets. It also quietly demanded that banks hold higher levels of reserves than international accounting laws required.
Consequently, it furtively “gold plated” – or rewrote – European Union rules to discourage Spanish banks from creating entities such as structured investment vehicles (SIVs). And when banks such as Santander embarked on an acquisition spree in Mexico, the central bank reined them back.
When the central bank initially took this stance, it looked pretty odd. After all, in the early years of this decade institutions such as the Federal Reserve were convinced that banks could hold less capital than before because innovation had made them less exposed to credit risk.
However, Spain had experienced a searing domestic banking crisis two decades earlier and its central bank was consequently risk averse. It was also more willing to be maverick than, say, the Germans.
None of this guarantees that Spain will escape the credit crisis unscathed. A domestic property bust is always painful.
However, Madrid’s conservative stance has helped to cushion the blow of the storm. And that highlights some interesting lessons. First, it shows some of the wisest financiers are those who have experienced shocks.
Second, Spain’s story shows it pays for small countries to challenge the dominant global consensus from time to time.
But third, the Spanish tale shows the benefit of having central banks involved in regulation. In recent years other European banks have also become uneasy about trends in the global banking world; look at statements made by Jean Claude Trichet, ECB president, last year. Yet Mr Trichet could never turn this vague alarm into tangible controls since the ECB did not oversee the banks.
However, as the storm grows worse in Europe’s banking world it is becoming clearer that this state of affairs will need to be reviewed. And one place to start any debate might be with an examination of why some banks are going bust – but some, such as Santander, notably are not.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
martes, 30 de septiembre de 2008
viernes, 26 de septiembre de 2008
Japan finds its model back in fashion
By David Pilling, Asia Editor
When foreigners visit Japan, one of their most common gripes is the difficulty of obtaining cash from bank machines or paying for purchases with credit cards. Such basic obstacles to their red-blooded desire to spend freely and to spend often have been seen as emblematic of an anachronistic financial system that has simply failed to keep pace with modern times.
Now laggard Japan does not look quite so stupid. Whether by luck or design, its financial institutions have been relatively unscathed by the financial crisis that has felled some of the biggest names on Wall Street. While its adventurous foreign brethren were off on a lucrative, but ultimately disastrous, spending spree, most Japanese banks continued to make the bulk of their money from old-fashioned lending.
Now the tables have turned. This week, Nomura has picked up Lehman assets at seemingly bargain-basement prices. Mitsubishi UFJ will pay some $8bn (€5.5bn, £4.3bn) for a sizeable chunk of Morgan Stanley, one of the few US investment banks left standing.
Yet the quick reversal of fortunes has led to remarkably little carping. “They’ve been admirably restrained considering they spent 10 years with the Americans telling them how to run things,” says Richard Jerram, economist at Macquarie Securities. “There must be a deep temptation to say: ‘You really mustn’t manipulate the market by banning short selling. You really must let this problem work out rather than having a low-transparency rescue plan,” he says, referring to continued prodding of Japan to adopt a more robust form of free-market capitalism.
Part of the restraint is due to the fact that, in attempting to resolve the crisis, the US is practising more or less what it preached to Japan in the 1990s. Then, US officials told Tokyo, often in no uncertain terms, that Japanese banks must recognise bad debts more quickly and that the government should replenish missing capital with public funds.
“The serious complaint about Japan was how long it took them,” says Mr Jerram. “The good thing you can say about America is that they are barely a year into this and they are throwing absolutely everything at it.”
Teizo Taya, a board member of the Bank of Japan when that institution was being criticised for its supposedly unimaginative policy in tackling deflation, is not carping either. “They won’t listen anyway,” he says.
But he does argue that, by aggressively lowering interest rates after the collapse of the tech bubble and after the emergence of the subprime crisis, the US response may have been just as flawed as Japan’s more conservative tack.
Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, once famously urged the Bank of Japan to buy ketchup – in other words, any asset going – to stop deflation. But many Japanese officials privately argue that pushing interest rates too low was the cause of the bubble that has now exploded so spectacularly. They also point to the BoJ’s once unfashionable assertion – now being reassessed worldwide – that central banks should not limit themselves to targeting consumer inflation but should work out how to prick asset bubbles as well.
One senior BoJ official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said on Friday: “I’m not saying it’s possible to detect a bubble and to stop it from bursting. But there are some things you can do.” More, for example, could have been done to take the heat out of the housing market, he said.
Mr Taya says of US monetary policy: “The lesson they thought they had learnt may not be correct. In one sense, their policy was quite successful. They avoided an economic downturn from 2001. But they forgot about the side-effects of easy policy.”
Japan, says Mr Taya, has benefited from the natural caution of its institutions. “Japanese are different from US investment banks. US banks just bought assets with money that they had borrowed. That business model has now collapsed.”
But neither does he attribute the relatively healthy position of Japanese banks to wisdom. “Japanese institutions were lagging behind. I don’t think there is any positive aspect to this. Until 2005 they were busy writing down bad debt. Then there was a pause period. There was simply no time for Japanese institutions to follow suit.”
A senior Japanese finance official puts it more succinctly. “I think this was more luck than prudence.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
When foreigners visit Japan, one of their most common gripes is the difficulty of obtaining cash from bank machines or paying for purchases with credit cards. Such basic obstacles to their red-blooded desire to spend freely and to spend often have been seen as emblematic of an anachronistic financial system that has simply failed to keep pace with modern times.
Now laggard Japan does not look quite so stupid. Whether by luck or design, its financial institutions have been relatively unscathed by the financial crisis that has felled some of the biggest names on Wall Street. While its adventurous foreign brethren were off on a lucrative, but ultimately disastrous, spending spree, most Japanese banks continued to make the bulk of their money from old-fashioned lending.
Now the tables have turned. This week, Nomura has picked up Lehman assets at seemingly bargain-basement prices. Mitsubishi UFJ will pay some $8bn (€5.5bn, £4.3bn) for a sizeable chunk of Morgan Stanley, one of the few US investment banks left standing.
Yet the quick reversal of fortunes has led to remarkably little carping. “They’ve been admirably restrained considering they spent 10 years with the Americans telling them how to run things,” says Richard Jerram, economist at Macquarie Securities. “There must be a deep temptation to say: ‘You really mustn’t manipulate the market by banning short selling. You really must let this problem work out rather than having a low-transparency rescue plan,” he says, referring to continued prodding of Japan to adopt a more robust form of free-market capitalism.
Part of the restraint is due to the fact that, in attempting to resolve the crisis, the US is practising more or less what it preached to Japan in the 1990s. Then, US officials told Tokyo, often in no uncertain terms, that Japanese banks must recognise bad debts more quickly and that the government should replenish missing capital with public funds.
“The serious complaint about Japan was how long it took them,” says Mr Jerram. “The good thing you can say about America is that they are barely a year into this and they are throwing absolutely everything at it.”
Teizo Taya, a board member of the Bank of Japan when that institution was being criticised for its supposedly unimaginative policy in tackling deflation, is not carping either. “They won’t listen anyway,” he says.
But he does argue that, by aggressively lowering interest rates after the collapse of the tech bubble and after the emergence of the subprime crisis, the US response may have been just as flawed as Japan’s more conservative tack.
Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, once famously urged the Bank of Japan to buy ketchup – in other words, any asset going – to stop deflation. But many Japanese officials privately argue that pushing interest rates too low was the cause of the bubble that has now exploded so spectacularly. They also point to the BoJ’s once unfashionable assertion – now being reassessed worldwide – that central banks should not limit themselves to targeting consumer inflation but should work out how to prick asset bubbles as well.
One senior BoJ official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said on Friday: “I’m not saying it’s possible to detect a bubble and to stop it from bursting. But there are some things you can do.” More, for example, could have been done to take the heat out of the housing market, he said.
Mr Taya says of US monetary policy: “The lesson they thought they had learnt may not be correct. In one sense, their policy was quite successful. They avoided an economic downturn from 2001. But they forgot about the side-effects of easy policy.”
Japan, says Mr Taya, has benefited from the natural caution of its institutions. “Japanese are different from US investment banks. US banks just bought assets with money that they had borrowed. That business model has now collapsed.”
But neither does he attribute the relatively healthy position of Japanese banks to wisdom. “Japanese institutions were lagging behind. I don’t think there is any positive aspect to this. Until 2005 they were busy writing down bad debt. Then there was a pause period. There was simply no time for Japanese institutions to follow suit.”
A senior Japanese finance official puts it more succinctly. “I think this was more luck than prudence.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
Dos dólares por toda la división europea de Lehman
El banco japonés Nomura compró la división europea y de Oriente Medio de Lehman Brothers por sólo dos dólares con el compromiso de mantener el empleos y hacerse cargo de los gastos de personal, según informa hoy el diario económico Nikkei.
Efe - Tokio - 26/09/2008
La entidad japonesa se gastará decenas de miles de millones de yenes en costes de personal para mantener los empleos de las divisiones de Asia, Europa y Oriente Medio de Lehman, de las que han pasado a hacerse cargo esta semana, después de que el 15 de septiembre el banco de inversión presentara una declaración de quiebra.
El acuerdo por el que Nomura se comprometía a conservar "una porción significativa" de los empleos de los trabajadores de Lehamn fue clave para que la casa de valores japonesa se impusiera al banco británico Barclays en la adquisición de la división europea y de Oriente Medio del banco estadounidense, según la agencia Kyodo.
Sólo en el caso de la compra de la división asiática de Lehman, incluyendo los costes por el banco y sus empleados, los japoneses tuvieron que pagar 24.000 millones de yenes (226 millones de dólares), de acuerdo con el Nikkei.
La compra de las tres divisiones le hubiera supuesto un desembolso de 700.000 millones de yenes (6.610 millones de yenes) en cualquier otro momento de bonanza de Lehman, según ese periódico.
La casa de valores nipona ya ha dicho que planea mantener los puestos de trabajo de cerca de 5.500 trabajadores de Lehman Brothers, 3.000 de la división asiática y 2.500 de la parte europea y de Oriente Medio.
Los gastos de personal le supondrán a Nomura un coste adicional al total de la operación de varias docenas de miles de yenes, según el rotativo.
Efe - Tokio - 26/09/2008
La entidad japonesa se gastará decenas de miles de millones de yenes en costes de personal para mantener los empleos de las divisiones de Asia, Europa y Oriente Medio de Lehman, de las que han pasado a hacerse cargo esta semana, después de que el 15 de septiembre el banco de inversión presentara una declaración de quiebra.
El acuerdo por el que Nomura se comprometía a conservar "una porción significativa" de los empleos de los trabajadores de Lehamn fue clave para que la casa de valores japonesa se impusiera al banco británico Barclays en la adquisición de la división europea y de Oriente Medio del banco estadounidense, según la agencia Kyodo.
Sólo en el caso de la compra de la división asiática de Lehman, incluyendo los costes por el banco y sus empleados, los japoneses tuvieron que pagar 24.000 millones de yenes (226 millones de dólares), de acuerdo con el Nikkei.
La compra de las tres divisiones le hubiera supuesto un desembolso de 700.000 millones de yenes (6.610 millones de yenes) en cualquier otro momento de bonanza de Lehman, según ese periódico.
La casa de valores nipona ya ha dicho que planea mantener los puestos de trabajo de cerca de 5.500 trabajadores de Lehman Brothers, 3.000 de la división asiática y 2.500 de la parte europea y de Oriente Medio.
Los gastos de personal le supondrán a Nomura un coste adicional al total de la operación de varias docenas de miles de yenes, según el rotativo.
miércoles, 24 de septiembre de 2008
El (des)gobierno de los bancos
Ignacio de la Torre. - 24/09/2008
El Confidencial
Decía Keynes que es mucho más fácil para el ser humano equivocarse junto a los demás que enfrentarse a la multitud y decir la verdad. Realicemos pues hoy un keynesiano ejercicio de dificultad. Les invito a que me acompañen.
¿Les sorprendería saber que, entre los consejeros independientes de Lehman Brothers, figuraba la anterior responsable de la Cruz Roja americana y de las Girl Scouts de ese país? ¿Conocían que otro de los consejeros independientes del quebrado banco llevaba 23 años dedicado a la producción de obras de teatro en Broadway?* La mitad de los consejeros de Merrill Lynch no tenía experiencia en banca. Como nos recordó Peter Hahn en el WSJ**, el antiguo presidente del denostado Northern Rock era un periodista científico. Los consejeros “independientes” de ABN en el penoso tiempo que llevó a su adquisición, disfrutaban de una media de ocho consejos, manipulando su independencia con el resultante escaso tiempo y abundante retribución.
Además, en el consejo de Royal Bank of Scotland, que compró ABN con una prima de un 70% en una de las adquisiciones más disparatadas de la historia, figuraban cinco consejeros a las órdenes del presidente. Luego hacía falta que nueve de los once independientes se alinearan contra el presidente para frenar tal alocada operación. No ocurrió, y como consecuencia de la misma el RBS tuvo que realizar la mayor ampliación de capital de la historia de Europa, con fortísimas diluciones para sus accionistas. Respecto a UBS, sólo tres de sus doce consejeros tenían conocimientos de banca. De ellos, dos en banca privada. Tan sólo uno, el antiguo presidente Marcel Ospel, conocía la banca de inversión, aunque su experiencia no se centraba en los derivados hipotecarios que provocaron las pérdidas del coloso suizo.
¿Creen que esta mezcolanza de autores teatrales o girl scouts conocía lo que era un CDO? ¿Un CDO al cuadrado? ¿Un CDS? ¿Un CLO? ¿Un SIV? ¿Un conduit? ¿Un préstamo puente? ¿Un monoline? Yo no tengo tampoco claro que los consejeros con supuesta experiencia financiera supieran un ápice sobre estos temas. Y, paradójicamente, estas instituciones han perdido 600.000 millones de dólares en estos instrumentos que poco o ningún miembro del Consejo de Administración entendía. Soy consciente de que esta ineptitud e ignorancia no es el único responsable de todo este desastre. Los esquemas retributivos asimétricos, una mala supervisión bancaria, el modelo de originar y distribuir, y sobre todo la suicida política que llevó la FED durante 2003-2005 al mantener tipos a niveles muy inferiores a los que habría debido, entre otros, tienen su parte de culpa. Sin embargo, apenas se ha escrito sobre los muy diversos consejos de los bancos. De ahí el presente artículo. ¿Se merecían las primas que cobraban?
Hace tiempo leí una columna del Financial Times firmada por un corresponsal que había visitado una escuela de negocios norteamericana. En el jardín del campus se había topado con un instructor y un grupo de alumnos MBA que tenían que imitar consecutivamente diferentes sonidos de animales. Uno era el perro, otro el ganso, otro el pájaro… Preguntó por el objetivo de tamaño ejercicio. El instructor comentó que era muy útil para permitir que el alumno se pusiera en la piel de un “ente” distinto de sí y de esta forma poder “entrenar” la diversidad.
En este mundo de corrección política, y de imbecilidad generalizada, la diversidad mal entendida campa a sus anchas. Y aunque esa imbecilidad pueda provocar la quiebra de una empresa alimenticia, la bancarrota de un banco es harina de otro costal, por las implicaciones que una crisis bancaria genera en el conjunto del sistema financiero, y por extensión, en la economía. La mejor responsabilidad social corporativa de un banco es sobrevivir y seguir prestando dinero. Sobreviviendo, el banco realizará una gran labor a la sociedad, y para sobrevivir se requiere un consejo capaz. Diverso si se quiere, pero antes que diverso, capaz.
Y acabo este artículo con una reflexión. Leíamos la semana pasada que una caja española había despedido a unos directivos por conceder hipotecas que estaban resultando fallidas, ya que entre los objetivos de estos directivos figuraba aumentar la concesión de hipotecas, con independencia de si resultaban fallidas. Está bien que se despida a estos directivos, pero ¿no debería despedirse antes a los miembros de la comisión de retribución responsable de tan aberrantes objetivos?
* Board comes under fire, FT, 17 de Septiembre de 2008.
**Blame the Bank Boards WSJ, 28 de Noviembre de 2007.
El Confidencial
Decía Keynes que es mucho más fácil para el ser humano equivocarse junto a los demás que enfrentarse a la multitud y decir la verdad. Realicemos pues hoy un keynesiano ejercicio de dificultad. Les invito a que me acompañen.
¿Les sorprendería saber que, entre los consejeros independientes de Lehman Brothers, figuraba la anterior responsable de la Cruz Roja americana y de las Girl Scouts de ese país? ¿Conocían que otro de los consejeros independientes del quebrado banco llevaba 23 años dedicado a la producción de obras de teatro en Broadway?* La mitad de los consejeros de Merrill Lynch no tenía experiencia en banca. Como nos recordó Peter Hahn en el WSJ**, el antiguo presidente del denostado Northern Rock era un periodista científico. Los consejeros “independientes” de ABN en el penoso tiempo que llevó a su adquisición, disfrutaban de una media de ocho consejos, manipulando su independencia con el resultante escaso tiempo y abundante retribución.
Además, en el consejo de Royal Bank of Scotland, que compró ABN con una prima de un 70% en una de las adquisiciones más disparatadas de la historia, figuraban cinco consejeros a las órdenes del presidente. Luego hacía falta que nueve de los once independientes se alinearan contra el presidente para frenar tal alocada operación. No ocurrió, y como consecuencia de la misma el RBS tuvo que realizar la mayor ampliación de capital de la historia de Europa, con fortísimas diluciones para sus accionistas. Respecto a UBS, sólo tres de sus doce consejeros tenían conocimientos de banca. De ellos, dos en banca privada. Tan sólo uno, el antiguo presidente Marcel Ospel, conocía la banca de inversión, aunque su experiencia no se centraba en los derivados hipotecarios que provocaron las pérdidas del coloso suizo.
¿Creen que esta mezcolanza de autores teatrales o girl scouts conocía lo que era un CDO? ¿Un CDO al cuadrado? ¿Un CDS? ¿Un CLO? ¿Un SIV? ¿Un conduit? ¿Un préstamo puente? ¿Un monoline? Yo no tengo tampoco claro que los consejeros con supuesta experiencia financiera supieran un ápice sobre estos temas. Y, paradójicamente, estas instituciones han perdido 600.000 millones de dólares en estos instrumentos que poco o ningún miembro del Consejo de Administración entendía. Soy consciente de que esta ineptitud e ignorancia no es el único responsable de todo este desastre. Los esquemas retributivos asimétricos, una mala supervisión bancaria, el modelo de originar y distribuir, y sobre todo la suicida política que llevó la FED durante 2003-2005 al mantener tipos a niveles muy inferiores a los que habría debido, entre otros, tienen su parte de culpa. Sin embargo, apenas se ha escrito sobre los muy diversos consejos de los bancos. De ahí el presente artículo. ¿Se merecían las primas que cobraban?
Hace tiempo leí una columna del Financial Times firmada por un corresponsal que había visitado una escuela de negocios norteamericana. En el jardín del campus se había topado con un instructor y un grupo de alumnos MBA que tenían que imitar consecutivamente diferentes sonidos de animales. Uno era el perro, otro el ganso, otro el pájaro… Preguntó por el objetivo de tamaño ejercicio. El instructor comentó que era muy útil para permitir que el alumno se pusiera en la piel de un “ente” distinto de sí y de esta forma poder “entrenar” la diversidad.
En este mundo de corrección política, y de imbecilidad generalizada, la diversidad mal entendida campa a sus anchas. Y aunque esa imbecilidad pueda provocar la quiebra de una empresa alimenticia, la bancarrota de un banco es harina de otro costal, por las implicaciones que una crisis bancaria genera en el conjunto del sistema financiero, y por extensión, en la economía. La mejor responsabilidad social corporativa de un banco es sobrevivir y seguir prestando dinero. Sobreviviendo, el banco realizará una gran labor a la sociedad, y para sobrevivir se requiere un consejo capaz. Diverso si se quiere, pero antes que diverso, capaz.
Y acabo este artículo con una reflexión. Leíamos la semana pasada que una caja española había despedido a unos directivos por conceder hipotecas que estaban resultando fallidas, ya que entre los objetivos de estos directivos figuraba aumentar la concesión de hipotecas, con independencia de si resultaban fallidas. Está bien que se despida a estos directivos, pero ¿no debería despedirse antes a los miembros de la comisión de retribución responsable de tan aberrantes objetivos?
* Board comes under fire, FT, 17 de Septiembre de 2008.
**Blame the Bank Boards WSJ, 28 de Noviembre de 2007.
martes, 23 de septiembre de 2008
Nomura ultima su reentrada en España con la compra de las actividades de Lehman en Europa
Los bancos japoneses salen de su escondite. Después de años de reestructuraciones -tras la crisis y ola de fusiones y adquisiciones de finales de los 90 y principios de esta década- están aprovechando la coyuntura actual crisis para ganar poder en el nuevo mapa bancario. Lo acaba de hacer el gigante Mitshubishi UFJ, el mayor banco del país, con la toma de un paquete de entre el 10% y 20% en Morgan Stanley. Pero otros también están interesados en crecer. Nomura Holdings, el mayor bróker japonés, se quedará finalmente con los activos de Lehman Brothers en Asia, tal y como confirmó la entidad en un comunicado.Pero el bróker presidido por Kenichi Watanabe también está negociando la compra de Lehman International Europe, la filial europea del caído banco de inversión, que se encuentra bajo la administración concursal de PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) desde Londres, lo que incluye las actividades en España y del equipo gestor que dirigen Luis de Guindos y Juan Gich. Con oficinas en Castellana 41 en Madrid, Nomura dará un salto cualitativo en nuestro país, especialmente, en el área de banca privada y en la de fusiones y adquisiciones que dirige a nivel global Hiromi Yamaji.Fuentes del banco en Madrid declinaron realizar comentarios y se remitieron a la nota oficial del grupo sobre la adquisición en Asia de Lehman. Antes de verano, Nomura presentó en Madrid un fondo de capital riesgo de 200 millones de euros bajo el nombre de Thesan Capital, que está dirigido por Santiago Corral, el hombre fuerte en España del banco japonés y que cuenta con la participación de José Luis Macho, ex ejecutivo del grupo de alimentación Campofrío. "Han ofrecido el mantenimiento de los puestos de trabajo con las mismas condiciones de los dos años anteriores", dijo una fuente conocedora de los contactos entre Lehman y Nomura, aunque no obstante, no llegará a ser tan generosa como la retribución variable que percibían los empleados antes de la quiebra, como informó este diario la semana pasada.Nomura compite con Barclays en hacerse con los activos europeos. La entidad británica ha tomado ya el controla la filial de Lehman en EEUU y creará así un gigante con 26.000 empleados y más de un billón de libras en activos bajo gestión bajo la enseña Barclays Capital, según informó la entidad desde Londres. Bob Diamond, director general del grupo británico, dirigirá así un nuevo grupo capaz de rivalizar con las grandes firmas históricas de Wall Street como Goldman, Morgan, Citigroup o JPMorgan.Y Morgan Stanley también tiene dueños japonesesParalelamente al troceo de Lehman Brothers en el que participa Nomura, otro gran banco de inversión pasará a estar controlado en gran parte, hasta un 20% del capital, por otro grupo japonés. Se trata de Morgan Stanley, que durante la última semana ya tiene nuevos accionistas. El banco de inversión ha alcanzado un principio de acuerdo con Mitsubishi UFJ, el mayor banco de Japón, para que tome una participación que podría oscilar entre el 10 y el 20 por ciento del capital del grupo dirigido por John Mack. La entidad japonesa no tiene presencia en España, cuya filial ha sido presidida durante los últimos años por Luis Isasi.
Fuente: El Confidencial
domingo, 21 de septiembre de 2008
¡Vuelve Gekko!
Uno de los líderes espirituales de este blog, el despiadado "broker" Gordon Gekko, volverá a las pantallas si el proyecto de la Fox sale adelante:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/05/movies/05movi.html?ex=1336017600&en=64f8ac17912072b8&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/05/movies/05movi.html?ex=1336017600&en=64f8ac17912072b8&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
viernes, 19 de septiembre de 2008
lunes, 15 de septiembre de 2008
The Japan Lesson: U.S. Must Own Up To Its Bank Crisis
The Wall Street Journal
By JUSTIN LAHARTSeptember 15, 2008;
When Japan was mired in economic crisis, the U.S. urged it to take decisive action to deal with its ailing banks. Japan didn't follow the advice and the crisis dragged on for years. Now, it is the U.S. that is mired in crisis and facing the prospect of swallowing the bitter medicine it once proffered.
Japan's stock-market bubble began rapidly deflating in 1990 and its property bubble followed suit shortly afterward. Many borrowers were unable to make payments on their debt and bad loans piled up on bank balance sheets. A long period of lackluster economic growth made a tough situation worse. With the financial system saddled with bad debts, Japan desperately needed its banks to acknowledge the severity of their problems and for some banks to shut their doors. But the banks, unwilling to take steps that might render them insolvent, refused to acknowledge their problems, extending the crisis.
"One of the lessons we took from Japan was the hesitation and refusal to own up to the problem was a disaster," says University of Chicago Graduate School of Business economist Anil Kashyap.
U.S. financial firms, too, have struggled with owning up to the extent of their credit losses, partly because those losses are a moving target. A year ago, Bear Stearns Cos. was reluctant to sell mortgage-related credit at a loss. That decision came back to haunt the firm as declining home prices continued to pummel mortgages, and Bear ended up in a government-backed fire sale to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive John Thain said in a January interview that the firm's troubles were "for the most part behind us" -- but in July the firm agreed to sell more than $30 billion in mortgage-related assets at a large loss.
Still, U.S. financial firms have been much quicker to acknowledge losses than their Japanese counterparts were. While the slicing and dicing of mortgages into tradable securities played a part in the mortgage mess, accounting rules make it difficult for firms to ignore losses on those securities, says Princeton University economist Hyun Song Shin. In contrast, by continuing to extend credit to bad borrowers, Japanese banks were able to put off recognizing the extent of their debt problems.
"The denial strategy is harder to pull off -- it will catch up to you in the accounting," says Mr. Shin. "That's one of the more encouraging and hopeful signs in the U.S."
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant mortgage companies that the U.S. government seized a week ago, operated under rules that made the extent of their woes much more difficult to assess. But Treasury officials took a tougher line getting Fannie and Freddie to own up to their problems than Japan's Ministry of Finance did with ailing Japanese banks. Just as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has been intent on not repeating the Fed's Depression-era mistakes, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is intent on not repeating Japan's mistakes in the 1990s, says Brad DeLong, an economic historian at the University of California at Berkeley.
One last problem the current U.S. situation shares with Japan in the 1990s may be a financial sector that is far larger than it should be. "If you have an unsustainable lending boom, then by definition the lending has to shrink," says Adam Posen, a deputy director at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
In Japan, that didn't happen. Rather than failing, troubled banks merged with healthier ones. But even though the combined bank would often end up with branches that were within steps of one another, few bank workers lost their jobs. Mr. Posen worries that concerns about the systemic risk to the financial system will prevent the U.S. from allowing enough firms to shut their doors to make the necessary capacity cuts.
In that regard, the tougher line with Wall Street that U.S. officials took over the weekend is encouraging. Refusing to financially backstop a takeover of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. with government money, as they did for J.P. Morgan's hasty acquisition of Bear Stearns, they showed they were far more willing to let a troubled firm fail than their Japanese counterparts were. Also, many financial firms have already begun cutting operations in a way Japanese banks balked at.
But while the U.S. has been decisive where Japan was not, it is worth remembering there was a reason Japan was hesitant to deal with its problems. Recognizing the financial sector's problems quickly increases the possibility of a run for the exits that could seize up the credit markets, putting the overall economy at greater risk. Quickly shrinking the financial sector could have a social cost, as well, putting tens of thousands of people out of work. Where will they go?
By JUSTIN LAHARTSeptember 15, 2008;
When Japan was mired in economic crisis, the U.S. urged it to take decisive action to deal with its ailing banks. Japan didn't follow the advice and the crisis dragged on for years. Now, it is the U.S. that is mired in crisis and facing the prospect of swallowing the bitter medicine it once proffered.
Japan's stock-market bubble began rapidly deflating in 1990 and its property bubble followed suit shortly afterward. Many borrowers were unable to make payments on their debt and bad loans piled up on bank balance sheets. A long period of lackluster economic growth made a tough situation worse. With the financial system saddled with bad debts, Japan desperately needed its banks to acknowledge the severity of their problems and for some banks to shut their doors. But the banks, unwilling to take steps that might render them insolvent, refused to acknowledge their problems, extending the crisis.
"One of the lessons we took from Japan was the hesitation and refusal to own up to the problem was a disaster," says University of Chicago Graduate School of Business economist Anil Kashyap.
U.S. financial firms, too, have struggled with owning up to the extent of their credit losses, partly because those losses are a moving target. A year ago, Bear Stearns Cos. was reluctant to sell mortgage-related credit at a loss. That decision came back to haunt the firm as declining home prices continued to pummel mortgages, and Bear ended up in a government-backed fire sale to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive John Thain said in a January interview that the firm's troubles were "for the most part behind us" -- but in July the firm agreed to sell more than $30 billion in mortgage-related assets at a large loss.
Still, U.S. financial firms have been much quicker to acknowledge losses than their Japanese counterparts were. While the slicing and dicing of mortgages into tradable securities played a part in the mortgage mess, accounting rules make it difficult for firms to ignore losses on those securities, says Princeton University economist Hyun Song Shin. In contrast, by continuing to extend credit to bad borrowers, Japanese banks were able to put off recognizing the extent of their debt problems.
"The denial strategy is harder to pull off -- it will catch up to you in the accounting," says Mr. Shin. "That's one of the more encouraging and hopeful signs in the U.S."
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant mortgage companies that the U.S. government seized a week ago, operated under rules that made the extent of their woes much more difficult to assess. But Treasury officials took a tougher line getting Fannie and Freddie to own up to their problems than Japan's Ministry of Finance did with ailing Japanese banks. Just as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has been intent on not repeating the Fed's Depression-era mistakes, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is intent on not repeating Japan's mistakes in the 1990s, says Brad DeLong, an economic historian at the University of California at Berkeley.
One last problem the current U.S. situation shares with Japan in the 1990s may be a financial sector that is far larger than it should be. "If you have an unsustainable lending boom, then by definition the lending has to shrink," says Adam Posen, a deputy director at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
In Japan, that didn't happen. Rather than failing, troubled banks merged with healthier ones. But even though the combined bank would often end up with branches that were within steps of one another, few bank workers lost their jobs. Mr. Posen worries that concerns about the systemic risk to the financial system will prevent the U.S. from allowing enough firms to shut their doors to make the necessary capacity cuts.
In that regard, the tougher line with Wall Street that U.S. officials took over the weekend is encouraging. Refusing to financially backstop a takeover of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. with government money, as they did for J.P. Morgan's hasty acquisition of Bear Stearns, they showed they were far more willing to let a troubled firm fail than their Japanese counterparts were. Also, many financial firms have already begun cutting operations in a way Japanese banks balked at.
But while the U.S. has been decisive where Japan was not, it is worth remembering there was a reason Japan was hesitant to deal with its problems. Recognizing the financial sector's problems quickly increases the possibility of a run for the exits that could seize up the credit markets, putting the overall economy at greater risk. Quickly shrinking the financial sector could have a social cost, as well, putting tens of thousands of people out of work. Where will they go?
Spanish Conquest Squeezes Italian Olive Oil
Family-Owned Labels Are Struggling to Compete With SOS Cuétara
The Wall Street Journal
By DAVIDE BERRETTASeptember 15, 2008;
By DAVIDE BERRETTASeptember 15, 2008;
Over the past five years, Italy's biggest olive-oil brands have fallen steadily into Spanish hands. SOS Cuétara SA's July purchase of Bertolli, one of the world's best-known olive-oil labels, gave the Spanish food company control of half the Italian market and made it the world's undisputed leader in olive-oil sales.
The Spanish conquest has left small olive-oil companies up and down Italy in a fix. Once synonymous with the olive-oil business around the world, family-owned Italian labels like Monini, Farchioni, Filippo Berio and Pietro Coricelli are now struggling to compete against the pricing power, marketing heft and distribution breadth of SOS. "It's not an easy path," says Roberto D'Auria, an analyst at agrarian research institute Ismea, who predicts that some of the brands may end up closing down or being put up for sale.
Massimo Gargano, chairman of the Italian olive grower association Unaprol, says Italy's small players face a "long entrepreneurial agony" amid competition from SOS.
Maria Flora Monini, co-owner of Olio Monini SpA, one of the largest Italian-owned labels, says she has received offers to buy the company, which sells 30 million bottles a year. For now, though, she says the family plans to hold on, sticking to its strategy of marketing Monini as a trendy "lifestyle" brand.
Most of Monini's nine varieties of olive oil are sold in supermarkets at moderate prices ranging from €4.50 to €7 ($6.40 to $9.95) a bottle, but the company is nonetheless working hard to enhance its brand. It sponsors some of Italy's largest music festivals, photo exhibitions at New York's Museum of Modern Art, and a magazine that is distributed to 100,000 subscribers three times a year. In 2003, it opened an olive-pressing factory, or frantoio, near the town of Spoleto, in Italy's central Umbria region, where it produces small quantities of olive oil and organizes olive tastings and cooking courses.
Pompeo Farchioni, chief executive of the 250-year-old Farchioni olive-oil brand from Umbria, says he has dabbled in the higher end of the market. He sells six "protected origin," or DOP, olive-oil varieties whose production is traced and certified. But those high-end bottles account for only 2% of Farchioni's overall yearly sales of €100 million. Most of the 20 million bottles Mr. Farchioni sells each year are priced between €4 and €6.
For the bulk of his business, Mr. Farchioni says, he is trying to get more space from retailers. But if that doesn't work and Farchioni starts losing money, "we might end up having to sell too," he says.
The olive-oil business conjures up romantic images of pungent green olives being squeezed through presses, and many olive-oil companies harvest some of their own olives. But the industry is mainly involved in bottling and marketing, and most bottles available in supermarkets are blends of Italian olive oil and oil made from Spanish, Greek or North African olives.
Most of Monini's nine varieties of olive oil are sold in supermarkets at moderate prices ranging from €4.50 to €7 ($6.40 to $9.95) a bottle, but the company is nonetheless working hard to enhance its brand. It sponsors some of Italy's largest music festivals, photo exhibitions at New York's Museum of Modern Art, and a magazine that is distributed to 100,000 subscribers three times a year. In 2003, it opened an olive-pressing factory, or frantoio, near the town of Spoleto, in Italy's central Umbria region, where it produces small quantities of olive oil and organizes olive tastings and cooking courses.
Pompeo Farchioni, chief executive of the 250-year-old Farchioni olive-oil brand from Umbria, says he has dabbled in the higher end of the market. He sells six "protected origin," or DOP, olive-oil varieties whose production is traced and certified. But those high-end bottles account for only 2% of Farchioni's overall yearly sales of €100 million. Most of the 20 million bottles Mr. Farchioni sells each year are priced between €4 and €6.
For the bulk of his business, Mr. Farchioni says, he is trying to get more space from retailers. But if that doesn't work and Farchioni starts losing money, "we might end up having to sell too," he says.
The olive-oil business conjures up romantic images of pungent green olives being squeezed through presses, and many olive-oil companies harvest some of their own olives. But the industry is mainly involved in bottling and marketing, and most bottles available in supermarkets are blends of Italian olive oil and oil made from Spanish, Greek or North African olives.
Still, olive-oil names from Italy generally hold more cachet than those from other countries. That's why SOS -- a food conglomerate that also sells crackers, coffee and rice -- began its major foray into the Italian market by buying Olio Sasso in 2004. SOS then took over Carapelli, a renowned olive-oil brand from Florence with strong sales in the U.S. And it bought Bertolli, which, according to data research firm Euromonitor, is the leading olive-oil brand in the world with 6% to 7% of global olive-oil sales. (When it bought Bertolli, it also acquired the Dante brand.)
It's a good time to be the market leader. Demand for olive oil has been growing nearly 10% each year over the past five years, in step with the increased focus on healthy eating, says Euromonitor. SOS is also moving into the actual production of olives and oil. It owns Todolivo, a company that specializes in intensive olive growing, along with more than 400 hectares of land in Portugal. The goal, SOS says, is to exert even more control over the entire chain of production and distribution.
To finance its growing olive-oil empire, SOS plans to spin off its four Italian olive-oil brands into a new company that will then be listed on the Milan stock market, says SOS Chief Executive Jesús Salazar. If the IPO, which is planned for sometime in the 2009 first half, is a success, SOS could be on the prowl for more Italian olive-oil brands, Mr. Salazar adds.
Pietro Coricelli SpA, a smaller Umbrian bottler, exports 65% of its olive oil to the U.S. and Northern Europe. CEO Lorenzo Coricelli says he doesn't plan to sell his company any time soon. He notes that revenue have nearly doubled over the past two years, helped by new business from selling olive oil to catering companies, which makes up about a quarter of his company's revenue.
But he is convinced change is afoot. In today's Italian olive oil market, he says, "there are about 30 companies. We should have seven or eight."
It's a good time to be the market leader. Demand for olive oil has been growing nearly 10% each year over the past five years, in step with the increased focus on healthy eating, says Euromonitor. SOS is also moving into the actual production of olives and oil. It owns Todolivo, a company that specializes in intensive olive growing, along with more than 400 hectares of land in Portugal. The goal, SOS says, is to exert even more control over the entire chain of production and distribution.
To finance its growing olive-oil empire, SOS plans to spin off its four Italian olive-oil brands into a new company that will then be listed on the Milan stock market, says SOS Chief Executive Jesús Salazar. If the IPO, which is planned for sometime in the 2009 first half, is a success, SOS could be on the prowl for more Italian olive-oil brands, Mr. Salazar adds.
Pietro Coricelli SpA, a smaller Umbrian bottler, exports 65% of its olive oil to the U.S. and Northern Europe. CEO Lorenzo Coricelli says he doesn't plan to sell his company any time soon. He notes that revenue have nearly doubled over the past two years, helped by new business from selling olive oil to catering companies, which makes up about a quarter of his company's revenue.
But he is convinced change is afoot. In today's Italian olive oil market, he says, "there are about 30 companies. We should have seven or eight."
miércoles, 10 de septiembre de 2008
La proyección exterior de España
Primo González
Estrella Digital 10/09/08
El presidente Rodríguez Zapatero se ha reunido con los embajadores españoles en el exterior para, entre otras cosas, pedirles que prediquen en el exterior la buena nueva de la economía española. Una tarea en la que el sector empresarial ha predicado abundantemente con el ejemplo en los últimos años, de modo que el máximo representante del Ejecutivo casi debería haberse reunido con los empresarios multinacionales españoles para expresarles una petición de este tipo, porque si algo se conoce bien en el exterior de las capacidades de los españoles son las habilidades de empresas y bancos, que han escalado en los últimos años a posiciones de relieve en la clasificación mundial de los negocios.
Es mucho sin duda lo que pueden hacer los embajadores desde sus sedes diplomáticas predicando las bondades del Gobierno de Zapatero en la cosa económica, pero mejor haría el presidente del Gobierno en aleccionar a los representantes diplomáticos españoles en el exterior para que presten un apoyo mucho más decidido a la actividad de las empresas nacionales, que rara vez acuden a las sedes diplomáticas españolas en el exterior para recabar una colaboración que saben de antemano que no se encuentra entre las prioridades que emanan del Palacio de Santa Cruz hacia la tupida red exterior española.
Más que convertirles en apóstoles y propagandistas de una verdad que ahora mismo cuesta trabajo hacer entender a los extranjeros, sobre todo porque hay que competir con rivales de la potencia del Financial Times, que se empeñan casi a diario en mostrar nuestras debilidades económicas (algunas con razón, aunque en su país de origen las padezcan en grado bastante superior), el jefe del Gobierno español debería haberles instruido con un manual práctico de apoyo a las iniciativas empresariales, ya que de ellas se derivarían importantes avances para una aún mayor internacionalización de las empresas españolas y, a la postre, para reducir el alarmante déficit comercial y de pagos con el exterior. Otros países nos podrían servir de ejemplo en esta tarea de activismo diplomático, empezando por Francia y siguiendo por algunos otros países desarrollados, auténticos maestros en el arte de abrir caminos a sus empresas nacionales. Las empresas españolas han logrado, sin embargo, importantes éxitos en el exterior sin que los apoyos diplomáticos hayan servido para desatascar ni allanar dificultad alguna. A pesar de ello, a pesar de la pusilánime acción exterior del Gobierno, las empresas españolas ocupan hoy posiciones muy destacadas en el exterior.
Nombres hay más de medio centenar capaces de encontrar un puesto de honor entre las empresas mundialmente más reconocidas. Hace poco, un estudio realizado sobre las empresas del Ibex 35, es decir, entre las principales empresas españoles con proyección pública importante, ponía de relieve que alrededor de la mitad de la facturación de las principales empresas del país se genera ya en los mercados internacionales. Hay algunas empresas que incluso rozan el 90% de sus ingresos procedentes del exterior y no se trata de empresas pequeñas, sino de compañías mundialmente reconocidas, como la siderúrgica Acerinox, una de las primeras del mundo en el segmento del acero inoxidable.
No sólo la procedencia de sus ingresos mayoritariamente procedentes del exterior denota la importante participación española en la globalización de la economía. También es preciso recordar las importantes compras que algunas empresas españolas de primera fila han realizado y siguen realizando en el exterior, incluso en países de primera fila como Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña o Alemania, además lógicamente de Latinoamérica, que fue por donde comenzó la extensión exterior de las empresas españolas a finales de los años 80.
La proyección empresarial española en el exterior está muy por encima de la de algunos países que superan ampliamente el PIB español y todo ello a pesar de la escasa relevancia que tiene la diplomacia española más allá de nuestras fronteras. Hay una más que evidente desproporción entre la presencia empresarial española en el exterior y nuestra presencia diplomática, una desproporción que con el Gobierno Zapatero se ha agudizado de forma alarmante. La arenga que Zapatero acaba de realizar a los diplomáticos españoles, no para que rectifiquen su pasividad en su actitud de apoyo a las empresas nacionales sino para que ensalcen la labor económica del Gobierno, coincide además con un cerrojazo a los presupuestos públicos que durante los últimos años han empezado a prodigarse en apoyo de la inversión española en el exterior y de la imagen económica de España. Mientras Zapatero predicaba estos días hermosas palabras para adornar los oídos de sus embajadores, con la otra mano les dejaba prácticamente sin un euro para desarrollar su trabajo. Ironías de la vida.
Estrella Digital 10/09/08
El presidente Rodríguez Zapatero se ha reunido con los embajadores españoles en el exterior para, entre otras cosas, pedirles que prediquen en el exterior la buena nueva de la economía española. Una tarea en la que el sector empresarial ha predicado abundantemente con el ejemplo en los últimos años, de modo que el máximo representante del Ejecutivo casi debería haberse reunido con los empresarios multinacionales españoles para expresarles una petición de este tipo, porque si algo se conoce bien en el exterior de las capacidades de los españoles son las habilidades de empresas y bancos, que han escalado en los últimos años a posiciones de relieve en la clasificación mundial de los negocios.
Es mucho sin duda lo que pueden hacer los embajadores desde sus sedes diplomáticas predicando las bondades del Gobierno de Zapatero en la cosa económica, pero mejor haría el presidente del Gobierno en aleccionar a los representantes diplomáticos españoles en el exterior para que presten un apoyo mucho más decidido a la actividad de las empresas nacionales, que rara vez acuden a las sedes diplomáticas españolas en el exterior para recabar una colaboración que saben de antemano que no se encuentra entre las prioridades que emanan del Palacio de Santa Cruz hacia la tupida red exterior española.
Más que convertirles en apóstoles y propagandistas de una verdad que ahora mismo cuesta trabajo hacer entender a los extranjeros, sobre todo porque hay que competir con rivales de la potencia del Financial Times, que se empeñan casi a diario en mostrar nuestras debilidades económicas (algunas con razón, aunque en su país de origen las padezcan en grado bastante superior), el jefe del Gobierno español debería haberles instruido con un manual práctico de apoyo a las iniciativas empresariales, ya que de ellas se derivarían importantes avances para una aún mayor internacionalización de las empresas españolas y, a la postre, para reducir el alarmante déficit comercial y de pagos con el exterior. Otros países nos podrían servir de ejemplo en esta tarea de activismo diplomático, empezando por Francia y siguiendo por algunos otros países desarrollados, auténticos maestros en el arte de abrir caminos a sus empresas nacionales. Las empresas españolas han logrado, sin embargo, importantes éxitos en el exterior sin que los apoyos diplomáticos hayan servido para desatascar ni allanar dificultad alguna. A pesar de ello, a pesar de la pusilánime acción exterior del Gobierno, las empresas españolas ocupan hoy posiciones muy destacadas en el exterior.
Nombres hay más de medio centenar capaces de encontrar un puesto de honor entre las empresas mundialmente más reconocidas. Hace poco, un estudio realizado sobre las empresas del Ibex 35, es decir, entre las principales empresas españoles con proyección pública importante, ponía de relieve que alrededor de la mitad de la facturación de las principales empresas del país se genera ya en los mercados internacionales. Hay algunas empresas que incluso rozan el 90% de sus ingresos procedentes del exterior y no se trata de empresas pequeñas, sino de compañías mundialmente reconocidas, como la siderúrgica Acerinox, una de las primeras del mundo en el segmento del acero inoxidable.
No sólo la procedencia de sus ingresos mayoritariamente procedentes del exterior denota la importante participación española en la globalización de la economía. También es preciso recordar las importantes compras que algunas empresas españolas de primera fila han realizado y siguen realizando en el exterior, incluso en países de primera fila como Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña o Alemania, además lógicamente de Latinoamérica, que fue por donde comenzó la extensión exterior de las empresas españolas a finales de los años 80.
La proyección empresarial española en el exterior está muy por encima de la de algunos países que superan ampliamente el PIB español y todo ello a pesar de la escasa relevancia que tiene la diplomacia española más allá de nuestras fronteras. Hay una más que evidente desproporción entre la presencia empresarial española en el exterior y nuestra presencia diplomática, una desproporción que con el Gobierno Zapatero se ha agudizado de forma alarmante. La arenga que Zapatero acaba de realizar a los diplomáticos españoles, no para que rectifiquen su pasividad en su actitud de apoyo a las empresas nacionales sino para que ensalcen la labor económica del Gobierno, coincide además con un cerrojazo a los presupuestos públicos que durante los últimos años han empezado a prodigarse en apoyo de la inversión española en el exterior y de la imagen económica de España. Mientras Zapatero predicaba estos días hermosas palabras para adornar los oídos de sus embajadores, con la otra mano les dejaba prácticamente sin un euro para desarrollar su trabajo. Ironías de la vida.
viernes, 5 de septiembre de 2008
New Candidates Emerge to Replace Japan's Premier
ASSOCIATED PRESSSeptember 5, 2008
TOKYO -- Two new candidates indicated Thursday they would join the race to replace Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda after his resignation this week, but a poll suggests voters want their say in national elections.
The Asahi, a major newspaper, said 56% of Japanese are in favor of dissolving parliament and holding general elections "as soon as possible," according to a telephone poll of 1,069 people conducted Tuesday and Wednesday. It didn't give a margin of error.
Speculation over which party members would enter the race began immediately after Mr. Fukuda made his surprise announcement, and Thursday several put their names forward.
Taro Aso, an outspoken and popular former foreign minister, has indicated a strong desire to run and is considered to be the favorite. Nobuteru Ishihara, the son of Tokyo's governor, said Thursday he would run against Mr. Aso if no other candidates emerged as challengers.
"I'm on the opposite end of the political spectrum from Secretary General Aso," Mr. Ishihara said. "So I have to create opportunities to speak from that stance."
Yuriko Koike, a former defense minister and TV anchorwoman, was widely reported to be considering entering her name, and said Thursday she was consulting with political allies. Economic Minister Kaoru Yosano also said Thursday he will seek the position.
The Liberal Democratic Party, which has been reluctant to call new elections, effectively picks the prime minister from within its ranks because it holds a majority in the powerful lower house of parliament.
The party has announced that it will choose a new leader on Sept. 22, and parliament was expected to install its choice as prime minister after it reconvenes on Sept. 24.
None of the ruling party's candidates were expected to stray much from the economic and diplomatic policies that Mr. Fukuda pursued, although Mr. Aso's nationalist stance could affect international relations.
Copyright © 2008 Associated Press
TOKYO -- Two new candidates indicated Thursday they would join the race to replace Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda after his resignation this week, but a poll suggests voters want their say in national elections.
The Asahi, a major newspaper, said 56% of Japanese are in favor of dissolving parliament and holding general elections "as soon as possible," according to a telephone poll of 1,069 people conducted Tuesday and Wednesday. It didn't give a margin of error.
Speculation over which party members would enter the race began immediately after Mr. Fukuda made his surprise announcement, and Thursday several put their names forward.
Taro Aso, an outspoken and popular former foreign minister, has indicated a strong desire to run and is considered to be the favorite. Nobuteru Ishihara, the son of Tokyo's governor, said Thursday he would run against Mr. Aso if no other candidates emerged as challengers.
"I'm on the opposite end of the political spectrum from Secretary General Aso," Mr. Ishihara said. "So I have to create opportunities to speak from that stance."
Yuriko Koike, a former defense minister and TV anchorwoman, was widely reported to be considering entering her name, and said Thursday she was consulting with political allies. Economic Minister Kaoru Yosano also said Thursday he will seek the position.
The Liberal Democratic Party, which has been reluctant to call new elections, effectively picks the prime minister from within its ranks because it holds a majority in the powerful lower house of parliament.
The party has announced that it will choose a new leader on Sept. 22, and parliament was expected to install its choice as prime minister after it reconvenes on Sept. 24.
None of the ruling party's candidates were expected to stray much from the economic and diplomatic policies that Mr. Fukuda pursued, although Mr. Aso's nationalist stance could affect international relations.
Copyright © 2008 Associated Press
lunes, 1 de septiembre de 2008
FUKUDA RESIGNS
Prime Minister Fukuda abruptly announces resignation
Kyodo News
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda announced Monday that he will step down from the post due to difficulties in implementing key policies such as one to address the nation's slowing economy, a step that will put an end to his government launched only in September last year.
"It is necessary to try to implement measures under a new framework...I thought now is the best time (to resign) to avoid a political vacuum," Fukuda, 72, told a hastily convened news conference.
Fukuda, who doubles as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, also said he instructed LDP Secretary General Taro Aso to prepare to hold a party presidential election to pick his successor, who will thus become prime minister.
Fukuda denied he has any health problems as he announced his resignation.
Fukuda, who took over the government from ailing Shinzo Abe, has been struggling with dismal support rates, despite a major Cabinet reshuffle he implemented in August.
Fuente: Japan Times
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