Jaime Martín* - 21/12/2008
Nada más desembarcar en el aeropuerto de Tokio lo primero que atrajo mi atención fueron los enormes letreros de la campaña de imagen Yokoso Japan, Bienvenido a Japón... ¿Bienvenido a Japón? Era el lema más ingenuo que podía imaginar, ¡podría funcionar en cualquier rincón del planeta! Me pregunté si escondía algo que a mí, occidental mesetario que por vez primera pisaba suelo japonés, me estaba vedado comprender. Finalmente olvidé el tema y me dispuse a disfrutar del viaje, prometiendo que mi visión de branding del mundo no se interpondría entre mí y el país nipón. Vaya, yo sí que era ingenuo.
Japón es un país fascinante, y la cultura y tendencias que de allí emanan ejercen desde hace algún tiempo influencia creciente. La cocina nipona es hoy omnipresente en nuestras ciudades, los jóvenes occidentales leen manga y juegan a la play, Issey Miyake es un referente en el mundo de la moda, Murakami ha vendido más de ocho millones de libros, Toyota hace del Prius el coche más ‘verde’ del planeta y directores extranjeros como Iñárritu (Babel) o Sofia Coppola (Lost in Translation) ruedan allí, no sólo porque Japón es la meta-modernidad, sino porque además vende un montón. No es la primera vez que esto ocurre. En el siglo XIX, Europa vivió una fiebre japonesa tras la apertura del país a punta de cañón por el comodoro Perry. En esos tiempos, el arte y la cultura japonesa viajaron hasta las capitales de medio mundo, conquistando el gusto de la multitud. Van Gogh o Gauguin se enamoraron de los grabados Ukiyo-e, en los cuales artistas como Hiroshige plasmaban la realidad con una sencillez nunca vista, presagiando el impresionismo e incluso el comic manga. Sigan conmigo, esto no va de pintura.
Tokio es el epicentro de las tendencias en Japón. Los japoneses adoran todo lo novedoso, y si se trata de artículos de lujo, mejor. En los últimos años ha surgido el fenómeno social de los solteros parásitos, jóvenes empleados que viven con sus papás y gastan todo su dinero en Vuitton o Chanel (vaya, como en España, solo que aquí no tienen un duro). En Tokio tuve la oportunidad de ver una enorme fila de chicas muy jóvenes que serpenteaba varias manzanas hasta desembocar en la recién inaugurada tienda H&M, la primera del país. Todos los turistas estábamos boquiabiertos ante aquel desenfreno por ser las primeras en ir a la última. Sin embargo, no es en la Chuo-Dori, la milla de oro, donde se ve lo último en tribus y moda urbana. Para eso hay que darse una vuelta por Shibuya y ver desfilar un sin fin de adolescentes emulando bebés, con pololos incluidos y pecas pintadas, chicas vestidas de criadas, chicos con chihuahuas del brazo, personajes salidos de comics manga, en fin, una carnaval.
Un lugar realmente fuera de lo común en Tokio es el mercado de pescado de Tsukiji. En la lonja se despachan a diario cientos de atunes. Al amanecer, los trabajadores alinean los pescados de hasta 300 kg en una nave, marcan los lotes con pintura roja, les dan un tajo en la cola, y luego los compradores toman muestras para comprobar su calidad. En un abrir y cerrar de ojos empieza la frenética puja, y poco después de allí parten los bichos para saciar el estómago de los amantes del sushi y el sashimi. Como reclamo turístico, este lugar tan poco convencional funciona y está lleno de turistas, añadiendo una capa más de atractivo a la ciudad. Curiosamente, Isabel Coixet toma la lonja como escenario en su próxima película.
Otra vez mi deformación profesional se interpone entre la realidad y mi yo viajero. El turismo actual busca experiencias más allá de la fórmula de palacios, museos y jardines. Esta demanda se puede canalizar haciendo branding de lugares insospechados. París lo hace con sus cementerios y sistemas de cloacas, Tokio con su lonja y sus tribus urbanas, Los Ángeles con sus pozos de petróleo y su mercado mejicano. En segundo lugar, al igual que hay product placement en las películas y en los libros, los city placement sirven para construir imagen. La ciudad condal, con Vicky Cristina Barcelona o La sombra del viento, supera a Madrid, ciudad a la que no le vendría mal que un gran director internacional se fijase en ella para rodar su próxima película.
Otra lección de branding desde Japón, especialmente ahora que tanto se habla y divaga sobre la ‘marca España’, es la amabilidad exquisita de los japoneses. El japonés hace todo lo posible para que el viajero se sienta a gusto. No gritan, sonríen, ponen suma atención en el detalle. En verano, cuando se llega a un hotel, lo primero que ofrecen es una toallita húmeda para aliviar el calor y en algunos lugares un te o un zumo. Son detalles pequeños, pero de gran importancia. Lógicamente forma parte de su cultura y de cómo son educados desde niños. En un país como España, donde tanta gente vive del turismo, y teniendo en cuenta que el modelo de sol y playa se agota, cabe pensar si el trato al turista podría mejorarse. Me contaba un amigo que en Barcelona vio como unos ingleses, tras pedir pantumaca, se comían a mordisco el tomate y el ajo, ante la indiferencia del camarero. Mi amigo por supuesto, se acercó y explicó como funcionaba aquello. Esto tal vez no sea la norma, pero para hacer de nuestro país un lugar cada vez más sugerente, la capacidad de servicio y la atención creo que deben mejorar. Detalles como ofrecer un zumo o una toallita no serían triviales, serían todo un símbolo de esa hospitalidad de la que tanto hacemos gala.
Al final de mi viaje, Yokoso Japan cobraba todo su sentido.
domingo, 21 de diciembre de 2008
martes, 2 de diciembre de 2008
Germany Aims to Guide the West’s Ties to Russia
MOSCOW — In the heat of the Georgia crisis in August, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany flew to Russia to warn about the consequences of renewed militarism. Two days later she was in Georgia, voicing support for the country’s eventual entry into NATO.
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Misha Japaridze/Associated Press
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany with President Dimitri A. Medvedev of Russia.
Autumn crept in and passions cooled. The beginning of October found Mrs. Merkel back in Russia, looking on as the German utility E.ON and the Russian state energy giant Gazprom signed a significant deal in St. Petersburg, giving the German firm a stake in the enormous Yuzhno-Russkoye natural gas field in Siberia.
Mrs. Merkel’s shifting focus served as a reminder of the pivotal role played by Germany in shaping the West’s relationship with Russia. It is Russia’s largest trading partner, Europe’s single biggest economy and one of America’s closest allies. Moscow’s aggressive posture has not only thrust Russia, a nuclear-armed energy power, back to the geopolitical spotlight. It has also dragged Germany there with it.
Just as the United States is struggling to redefine its relationship with a resurgent and at times antagonistic government in Moscow, Germany is scrambling to protect the close commercial, cultural and diplomatic ties with Russia it has forged since the end of the cold war — and, in some areas, long before.
How broad that divide has grown will become clearer this week, when NATO foreign ministers gather in Brussels. Berlin and Washington are at odds over how to deal with NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine — a tussle that at its heart is about how to deal with Russia.
As the United States aims mainly to counter Russia’s newfound military assertiveness, Germany favors steps to develop Russia economically and ensure its political stability. Germany sees its responsibility to guide Russia, not contain it.
The incoming Obama administration, which has vowed to pursue a new path to curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions as well as achieving other foreign policy goals that involve Russia, may find that one road to Moscow runs through Berlin. At a minimum, it seems likely to have to address Germany’s deeper interests in Russia.
“There are serious disagreements between Washington and Berlin from which Moscow can only benefit if there is not better coordination,” said Angela Stent, who served as the top Russia officer at the United States government’s National Intelligence Council from 2004 to 2006 and now directs Russian studies at Georgetown University. “The Obama administration should work with the Germans as it reassesses U.S. policy toward Russia.”
Weary of American lectures about the fact that 36 percent of the natural gas that heats German homes comes from Russia, some German politicians wonder how Americans can worry more about this energy dependence than they themselves do.
“Many Germans believe Bush only invaded Iraq for oil, and many Americans believe Germany’s Russia policy is determined by gas,” said Karsten D. Voigt, who coordinates German-American relations in the German Foreign Ministry and who for years ran the German-Russian parliamentary group in the German Parliament. “Every German government since at least the 1970s has tried to bind Russia, and before that the Soviet Union, more closely with Europe.”
Sergei Kupriyanov, a representative of Gazprom, said, “Our cooperation began during the cold war,” referring to deals — opposed by the United States — that laid gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in the 1970s. “The Berlin Wall still existed,” he said. “Compared to what we had then, Georgia is just peanuts.”
Germans see not dependence on Russia, but interdependence. The European Union’s 27 nations account for 80 percent of the cumulative foreign investment in Russia, a fact starkly exposed — if the Kremlin ever forgot — by the flight of capital after the Georgia crisis.
The Europeans, after Georgia, angrily froze negotiations with Russia over a new partnership agreement. Barely 10 weeks later, they decided to resume the talks. “We cannot build a European architecture against Russia or without Russia, only with Russia,” said Alexander Rahr, director of the Russian/Eurasian program at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
While Germany needs Russia’s raw materials and covets the significant market there for its precision machine tools, Russia is equally dependent on European investment to diversify its economy, a fact driven home all too clearly for Russians now that the financial crisis has sent energy prices plunging.
In the city of Yaroslavl, an automotive company, the GAZ Group, still makes diesel truck engines in a factory first built in the waning days of czarist rule in 1916. The production model evokes Soviet times, starting with iron in the foundry on the site, with workers building almost the entire engine from scratch.
A short drive away, past clusters of birch trees, is a field of concrete, metal trusses and corrugated iron roofing. It is the beginning of a state-of-the-art production plant for the company’s new engine model, a project valued at $442 million.
The plant sits a few hours north of Moscow by car, but the names of the suppliers sound like a roll call of German industry, with most of the new machinery and production lines supplied by German companies like Grob-Werke and ThyssenKrupp Krause.
“Germany is, in terms of technology, expertise and know how in the automotive industry, I think the best in the world,” said Ruslan Grekov, the project director for the new engine in Yaroslavl. “Of course, Germany is different from Russia. The difference is good.”
Such sentiments might seem surprising, even jarring, in a country where, in Soviet times, Nazis were vilified in a daily diet of war movies.
But the bonds between Europe’s two largest countries were forged over centuries, as German nobles like Catherine the Great became Russian royalty and German generals led the czar’s armies. German craftsmen worked in Moscow while German farmers settled near the Volga River.
The relationship has been tempered on the German side with guilt over World War II and gratitude over German reunification.
But always the anchor has been business, with Germany’s technical skill complementing Russia’s vast resources. The German conglomerate Siemens laid the Russian state telegraph network in the 1850s. Stalin built Soviet industrial might in his first Five-Year Plan in large part with German machines.
The current global slowdown has sent ripples of fear across Russia about a possible repeat of the 1998 collapse of the ruble. The World Bank halved its expectation for Russian growth next year, but it was still 3 percent, whereas the German economy, already in recession, is expected to contract, making Russia all the more important as layoffs in Germany mount.
Trade between Russia and Germany grew 25 percent to $49.3 billion in the first half of the year. Russia is one of Germany’s fastest-growing markets. Last year, German exports to Russia totaled $36 billion, more than five times the $6.7 billion exported from the United States to Russia.
German businessmen not only work out of sales offices in Moscow or invest in the country’s rich oil and gas fields. They are all over — from Siberia to Yekaterinburg to St. Petersburg, with some 4,600 companies in all investing $13.2 billion, building factories and delivering machinery to Russians who aspire to be more than the raw-goods store for European neighbors.
Today, Siemens is supplying Russia with its first high-speed trains, known as the Velaro RUS. The contract is worth $758 million for Siemens, half for the trains and half for servicing.
The oligarch Roman Abramovich’s construction firm Infrastruktura announced this year that it had ordered the world’s largest drill from the German company Herrenknecht to bore tunnels in Moscow and near Sochi in preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympics.
Igor Yurgens, executive board chairman at the Institute of Contemporary Development in Moscow, of which President Dimitri A. Medvedev is board chairman, said Germany was a strategic partner and the most patient investor in Russia’s future.
“We do not have laws in this country, but we have a lot of friendships, and friendship is more important than laws,” Mr. Yurgens said, in an interview in his Moscow office just off the city’s Garden Ring Road, where sputtering old Ladas inch through jams alongside late-model Mercedes sedans. “That’s historically so. And with Germans, this is the case.”
“On the background of this economic very strong cooperation and involvement, their criticism is taken a bit more lightly than the criticism of some others who do nothing at all, but just keep criticizing,” Mr. Yurgens added.
When Mr. Medvedev threatened after the American election to place new missiles in Kaliningrad, the location was a symbol of the painful, complex relationship between Russia and Germany. That island of Russian territory — awkwardly perched between the NATO members Poland and Lithuania — was the German city of Königsberg before it fell to the Soviets in the wake of World War II.
Yet in a sign of the opportunities presented by the Russian-German-American triangle, it was Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, from the usually Russia-friendly Social Democrats, who issued perhaps the sternest rebuff to Mr. Medvedev. It was “the wrong signal at the wrong time,” Mr. Steinmeier said the next day.
The incoming Obama administration, German officials say quietly, should take note. As indicated by Mr. Medvedev’s backpedaling since, the Russians apparently did.
Skip to next paragraph
Misha Japaridze/Associated Press
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany with President Dimitri A. Medvedev of Russia.
Autumn crept in and passions cooled. The beginning of October found Mrs. Merkel back in Russia, looking on as the German utility E.ON and the Russian state energy giant Gazprom signed a significant deal in St. Petersburg, giving the German firm a stake in the enormous Yuzhno-Russkoye natural gas field in Siberia.
Mrs. Merkel’s shifting focus served as a reminder of the pivotal role played by Germany in shaping the West’s relationship with Russia. It is Russia’s largest trading partner, Europe’s single biggest economy and one of America’s closest allies. Moscow’s aggressive posture has not only thrust Russia, a nuclear-armed energy power, back to the geopolitical spotlight. It has also dragged Germany there with it.
Just as the United States is struggling to redefine its relationship with a resurgent and at times antagonistic government in Moscow, Germany is scrambling to protect the close commercial, cultural and diplomatic ties with Russia it has forged since the end of the cold war — and, in some areas, long before.
How broad that divide has grown will become clearer this week, when NATO foreign ministers gather in Brussels. Berlin and Washington are at odds over how to deal with NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine — a tussle that at its heart is about how to deal with Russia.
As the United States aims mainly to counter Russia’s newfound military assertiveness, Germany favors steps to develop Russia economically and ensure its political stability. Germany sees its responsibility to guide Russia, not contain it.
The incoming Obama administration, which has vowed to pursue a new path to curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions as well as achieving other foreign policy goals that involve Russia, may find that one road to Moscow runs through Berlin. At a minimum, it seems likely to have to address Germany’s deeper interests in Russia.
“There are serious disagreements between Washington and Berlin from which Moscow can only benefit if there is not better coordination,” said Angela Stent, who served as the top Russia officer at the United States government’s National Intelligence Council from 2004 to 2006 and now directs Russian studies at Georgetown University. “The Obama administration should work with the Germans as it reassesses U.S. policy toward Russia.”
Weary of American lectures about the fact that 36 percent of the natural gas that heats German homes comes from Russia, some German politicians wonder how Americans can worry more about this energy dependence than they themselves do.
“Many Germans believe Bush only invaded Iraq for oil, and many Americans believe Germany’s Russia policy is determined by gas,” said Karsten D. Voigt, who coordinates German-American relations in the German Foreign Ministry and who for years ran the German-Russian parliamentary group in the German Parliament. “Every German government since at least the 1970s has tried to bind Russia, and before that the Soviet Union, more closely with Europe.”
Sergei Kupriyanov, a representative of Gazprom, said, “Our cooperation began during the cold war,” referring to deals — opposed by the United States — that laid gas pipelines between Russia and Germany in the 1970s. “The Berlin Wall still existed,” he said. “Compared to what we had then, Georgia is just peanuts.”
Germans see not dependence on Russia, but interdependence. The European Union’s 27 nations account for 80 percent of the cumulative foreign investment in Russia, a fact starkly exposed — if the Kremlin ever forgot — by the flight of capital after the Georgia crisis.
The Europeans, after Georgia, angrily froze negotiations with Russia over a new partnership agreement. Barely 10 weeks later, they decided to resume the talks. “We cannot build a European architecture against Russia or without Russia, only with Russia,” said Alexander Rahr, director of the Russian/Eurasian program at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
While Germany needs Russia’s raw materials and covets the significant market there for its precision machine tools, Russia is equally dependent on European investment to diversify its economy, a fact driven home all too clearly for Russians now that the financial crisis has sent energy prices plunging.
In the city of Yaroslavl, an automotive company, the GAZ Group, still makes diesel truck engines in a factory first built in the waning days of czarist rule in 1916. The production model evokes Soviet times, starting with iron in the foundry on the site, with workers building almost the entire engine from scratch.
A short drive away, past clusters of birch trees, is a field of concrete, metal trusses and corrugated iron roofing. It is the beginning of a state-of-the-art production plant for the company’s new engine model, a project valued at $442 million.
The plant sits a few hours north of Moscow by car, but the names of the suppliers sound like a roll call of German industry, with most of the new machinery and production lines supplied by German companies like Grob-Werke and ThyssenKrupp Krause.
“Germany is, in terms of technology, expertise and know how in the automotive industry, I think the best in the world,” said Ruslan Grekov, the project director for the new engine in Yaroslavl. “Of course, Germany is different from Russia. The difference is good.”
Such sentiments might seem surprising, even jarring, in a country where, in Soviet times, Nazis were vilified in a daily diet of war movies.
But the bonds between Europe’s two largest countries were forged over centuries, as German nobles like Catherine the Great became Russian royalty and German generals led the czar’s armies. German craftsmen worked in Moscow while German farmers settled near the Volga River.
The relationship has been tempered on the German side with guilt over World War II and gratitude over German reunification.
But always the anchor has been business, with Germany’s technical skill complementing Russia’s vast resources. The German conglomerate Siemens laid the Russian state telegraph network in the 1850s. Stalin built Soviet industrial might in his first Five-Year Plan in large part with German machines.
The current global slowdown has sent ripples of fear across Russia about a possible repeat of the 1998 collapse of the ruble. The World Bank halved its expectation for Russian growth next year, but it was still 3 percent, whereas the German economy, already in recession, is expected to contract, making Russia all the more important as layoffs in Germany mount.
Trade between Russia and Germany grew 25 percent to $49.3 billion in the first half of the year. Russia is one of Germany’s fastest-growing markets. Last year, German exports to Russia totaled $36 billion, more than five times the $6.7 billion exported from the United States to Russia.
German businessmen not only work out of sales offices in Moscow or invest in the country’s rich oil and gas fields. They are all over — from Siberia to Yekaterinburg to St. Petersburg, with some 4,600 companies in all investing $13.2 billion, building factories and delivering machinery to Russians who aspire to be more than the raw-goods store for European neighbors.
Today, Siemens is supplying Russia with its first high-speed trains, known as the Velaro RUS. The contract is worth $758 million for Siemens, half for the trains and half for servicing.
The oligarch Roman Abramovich’s construction firm Infrastruktura announced this year that it had ordered the world’s largest drill from the German company Herrenknecht to bore tunnels in Moscow and near Sochi in preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympics.
Igor Yurgens, executive board chairman at the Institute of Contemporary Development in Moscow, of which President Dimitri A. Medvedev is board chairman, said Germany was a strategic partner and the most patient investor in Russia’s future.
“We do not have laws in this country, but we have a lot of friendships, and friendship is more important than laws,” Mr. Yurgens said, in an interview in his Moscow office just off the city’s Garden Ring Road, where sputtering old Ladas inch through jams alongside late-model Mercedes sedans. “That’s historically so. And with Germans, this is the case.”
“On the background of this economic very strong cooperation and involvement, their criticism is taken a bit more lightly than the criticism of some others who do nothing at all, but just keep criticizing,” Mr. Yurgens added.
When Mr. Medvedev threatened after the American election to place new missiles in Kaliningrad, the location was a symbol of the painful, complex relationship between Russia and Germany. That island of Russian territory — awkwardly perched between the NATO members Poland and Lithuania — was the German city of Königsberg before it fell to the Soviets in the wake of World War II.
Yet in a sign of the opportunities presented by the Russian-German-American triangle, it was Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, from the usually Russia-friendly Social Democrats, who issued perhaps the sternest rebuff to Mr. Medvedev. It was “the wrong signal at the wrong time,” Mr. Steinmeier said the next day.
The incoming Obama administration, German officials say quietly, should take note. As indicated by Mr. Medvedev’s backpedaling since, the Russians apparently did.
miércoles, 19 de noviembre de 2008
¿Deuda de EEUU denominada en yenes? El 'bono Obama' podría suceder al 'bono Carter'
elEconomista.es 11Los economistas japoneses, cada vez más preocupados por la posibilidad de que Estados Unidos pague su enorme y creciente deuda en dólares, podrían pedir que los bonos del Tesoro se emitan en yenes, según recoge el Asia Times Online. Y es que aunque ahora parece poco probable que EEUU suspenda pagos, un dólar débil podría ser una ayuda para aliviar el peso de la deuda del país. China ha superado a Japón como mayor tenedor de bonos del Tesoro de EEUU.
"No hay ninguna duda de que el dólar se debilitará", dijo al periódico asiático Eisuke Sakakibara, profesor de la Waseda University. "El dólar está fuerte ahora por razones técnicas. El dinero que las firmas estadounidenses invirtieron por el mundo está siendo repatriado, provocando una compra de dólares. Pero una vez que esto termine, la moneda volverá a bajar", añadió Sakakibara.
De hecho, los economistas japoneses ya estarían pidiendo a Obama que emita deuda en yenes y otras monedas, según el Asia Times, lo que permitiría reducir el riesgo percibido de ser tenedor de bonos estadounidenses.
Ya lo hizo Carter
Esta idea, de todas formas, no es nueva porque el presidente Jimmy Carter ya lo hizo en la década de los 70 a consecuencia de las crisis del petróleo con los denominados Bonos Carter. Además, en 1978 emitió deuda denominada en marcos alemanes y francos suizos para atraer a más inversores.
"Estados Unidos se va a ver forzado a emitir bonos denominados en monedas extranjeras", explicó Kazuo Mizuno, de Mitsubishi UFJ Securities. "Estados Unidos no puede financiarse por sí mismo. El sistema financiero estadounidense no puede sobrevivir sin inversores extranjeros. Veremos Bonos Obama en el futuro", añadió.
El yen ha sido hasta ahora una de las monedas que más se han apreciado con la crisis financiera internacional, aupado por los inversores que deshacían sus posiciones de carry trade (pedir prestado en yenes por su bajo coste y cambiarlo por otras monedas para invertir en productos que rendían más que el tipo de interés pagado en Japón).
Así, la divisa nipona ha avanzado un 15% frente al dólar, un 33% frente al euro y un 53% frente a la libra. Así, según se revaloriza el yen disminuye el valor real de los activos de deuda denominada en dólares que compraron los inversores asiáticos, algo que no ocurriría con bonos denominados en yenes.:18 - 19/11/2008
"No hay ninguna duda de que el dólar se debilitará", dijo al periódico asiático Eisuke Sakakibara, profesor de la Waseda University. "El dólar está fuerte ahora por razones técnicas. El dinero que las firmas estadounidenses invirtieron por el mundo está siendo repatriado, provocando una compra de dólares. Pero una vez que esto termine, la moneda volverá a bajar", añadió Sakakibara.
De hecho, los economistas japoneses ya estarían pidiendo a Obama que emita deuda en yenes y otras monedas, según el Asia Times, lo que permitiría reducir el riesgo percibido de ser tenedor de bonos estadounidenses.
Ya lo hizo Carter
Esta idea, de todas formas, no es nueva porque el presidente Jimmy Carter ya lo hizo en la década de los 70 a consecuencia de las crisis del petróleo con los denominados Bonos Carter. Además, en 1978 emitió deuda denominada en marcos alemanes y francos suizos para atraer a más inversores.
"Estados Unidos se va a ver forzado a emitir bonos denominados en monedas extranjeras", explicó Kazuo Mizuno, de Mitsubishi UFJ Securities. "Estados Unidos no puede financiarse por sí mismo. El sistema financiero estadounidense no puede sobrevivir sin inversores extranjeros. Veremos Bonos Obama en el futuro", añadió.
El yen ha sido hasta ahora una de las monedas que más se han apreciado con la crisis financiera internacional, aupado por los inversores que deshacían sus posiciones de carry trade (pedir prestado en yenes por su bajo coste y cambiarlo por otras monedas para invertir en productos que rendían más que el tipo de interés pagado en Japón).
Así, la divisa nipona ha avanzado un 15% frente al dólar, un 33% frente al euro y un 53% frente a la libra. Así, según se revaloriza el yen disminuye el valor real de los activos de deuda denominada en dólares que compraron los inversores asiáticos, algo que no ocurriría con bonos denominados en yenes.:18 - 19/11/2008
viernes, 7 de noviembre de 2008
Los consejos de Panasonic y Sanyo aprueban una alianza de negocio y capital
Panasonic y Sanyo acordaron hoy en sendas reuniones de sus respectivos consejos de administración comenzar el proceso para una alianza de capital y de negocio entre las dos compañías.
Sanyo se convertirá en una subsidiaria de Panasonic, compañía conocida hasta el pasado octubre como Matsushita, y la firma resultante de la suma de ambas será la mayor del sector de la electrónica japonesa.
Panasonic concretará una oferta en enero para adquirir la mayoría de las acciones de Sanyo, después de negociar con los principales accionistas, los bancos japoneses Sumitomo Mitsui y Daiwa Securities SMBC, y el estadounidense Goldman Sachs Group. En 2006 Sanyo emitió 300.000 millones de yenes (3.039 millones de dólares) en acciones preferentes que compraron los tres bancos. Si esas acciones se convirtieran en acciones comunes, la participación supondría el 70% de los derechos de voto de la compañía.
Sumitomo Mitsui y Daiwa Securities están básicamente a favor de la intención de compra de Panasonic, según las fuentes de Kyodo, pero Goldman Sachs no ha mostrado una intención clara.
Si la operación se lleva a cabo con éxito Panasonic y Sanyo deberán solucionar la duplicación de operaciones como la producción de semiconductores y electrodomésticos, pero probablemente se mantendrán tanto los sistemas de operaciones, como la fuerza laboral y la marca de Sanyo.
Sanyo se convertirá en una subsidiaria de Panasonic, compañía conocida hasta el pasado octubre como Matsushita, y la firma resultante de la suma de ambas será la mayor del sector de la electrónica japonesa.
Panasonic concretará una oferta en enero para adquirir la mayoría de las acciones de Sanyo, después de negociar con los principales accionistas, los bancos japoneses Sumitomo Mitsui y Daiwa Securities SMBC, y el estadounidense Goldman Sachs Group. En 2006 Sanyo emitió 300.000 millones de yenes (3.039 millones de dólares) en acciones preferentes que compraron los tres bancos. Si esas acciones se convirtieran en acciones comunes, la participación supondría el 70% de los derechos de voto de la compañía.
Sumitomo Mitsui y Daiwa Securities están básicamente a favor de la intención de compra de Panasonic, según las fuentes de Kyodo, pero Goldman Sachs no ha mostrado una intención clara.
Si la operación se lleva a cabo con éxito Panasonic y Sanyo deberán solucionar la duplicación de operaciones como la producción de semiconductores y electrodomésticos, pero probablemente se mantendrán tanto los sistemas de operaciones, como la fuerza laboral y la marca de Sanyo.
lunes, 3 de noviembre de 2008
Algunas lecciones de la crisis japonesa
Publicado el 03-11-2008 , por José Carlos Díez. Economista jefe de InterMoney
En 1991, la bolsa japonesa y los precios inmobiliarios se desplomaron y provocaron la peor crisis de un país desarrollado desde la Gran Depresión. El sistema bancario había financiado toda aquella locura y el desplome del valor de los colaterales provocó una quiebra sistémica, cuyo saneamiento ha costado el 15% del PIB japonés.
La principal característica de la crisis fue la inacción, tanto de los responsables de la política económica como de las empresas y de los bancos.
Cuando comenzaron a tomar medidas, el sistema financiero estaba quebrado, la economía entró en una trampa de la liquidez keynesiana, la política monetaria perdió efectividad y el policy mix de política económica fue desastroso, especialmente la política cambiaria y fiscal que acabaron neutralizando sus efectos restando efectividad a las medidas. A continuación, se va analizar las consecuencias de la crisis, que más de tres lustros después mantienen a la economía nipona al borde de la deflación.
La deflación malignaLa deflación es una patología atípica y es lógico que los economistas nos preocupemos más de proteger a las economías de la inflación que es más habitual. Pero, Japón es un ejemplo de la deflación y sus efectos deben hacer que cualquier sociedad tome las medidas que sean necesarias para protegerse de ella.
La principal característica de la crisis fue la inacción, tanto de los responsables de la política económica como de las empresas y de los bancos.
Cuando comenzaron a tomar medidas, el sistema financiero estaba quebrado, la economía entró en una trampa de la liquidez keynesiana, la política monetaria perdió efectividad y el policy mix de política económica fue desastroso, especialmente la política cambiaria y fiscal que acabaron neutralizando sus efectos restando efectividad a las medidas. A continuación, se va analizar las consecuencias de la crisis, que más de tres lustros después mantienen a la economía nipona al borde de la deflación.
La deflación malignaLa deflación es una patología atípica y es lógico que los economistas nos preocupemos más de proteger a las economías de la inflación que es más habitual. Pero, Japón es un ejemplo de la deflación y sus efectos deben hacer que cualquier sociedad tome las medidas que sean necesarias para protegerse de ella.
En el gráfico 1 se puede observar la debilidad del crecimiento de del PIB que ha registrado un crecimiento promedio anual de 1,3% desde 2001 hasta 2007. Destaca la debilidad del consumo privado y la inversión y la fortaleza de las exportaciones.
Cuando las familias tienen expectativas deflacionistas retrasan sus decisiones de consumo, especialmente de bienes duraderos, ya que esperan que al año siguiente podrán comprar los bienes más baratos.
La debilidad de consumo estanca las ventas de las empresas y la deflación de precios, junto a salarios nominales rígidos a la baja, hunde los márgenes empresariales, lo cual elimina cualquier incentivo a invertir en nuevos proyectos empresariales e incluso en proteger a la capacidad instalada de su depreciación.
Esto explica que la tesis de Keynes en la teoría General fuera que ante la contracción de la demanda efectiva, tenía que ser el gasto público el que compensase los efectos de deflación para evitar en una caída en picado de la acumulación de capital que hundiese el crecimiento potencial.
Cuando las familias tienen expectativas deflacionistas retrasan sus decisiones de consumo, especialmente de bienes duraderos, ya que esperan que al año siguiente podrán comprar los bienes más baratos.
La debilidad de consumo estanca las ventas de las empresas y la deflación de precios, junto a salarios nominales rígidos a la baja, hunde los márgenes empresariales, lo cual elimina cualquier incentivo a invertir en nuevos proyectos empresariales e incluso en proteger a la capacidad instalada de su depreciación.
Esto explica que la tesis de Keynes en la teoría General fuera que ante la contracción de la demanda efectiva, tenía que ser el gasto público el que compensase los efectos de deflación para evitar en una caída en picado de la acumulación de capital que hundiese el crecimiento potencial.
Por fortuna para Japón, la burbuja se concentró en el precio de los activos inmobiliarios y de las acciones pero no se contagió al resto del mundo, por lo que gracias a su elevada capacidad tecnológica la economía puede mantener el crecimiento y la acumulación de capital vía exportaciones. Eso libró a Japón de la pobreza extrema que si se produjo en la Gran Depresión.
En el gráfico 2 se puede observar cómo el sector público tardó varios años en implementar políticas fiscales expansivas y cuando lo hizo fue ineficaz, al no priorizar el gasto en infraestructuras y acompañarlo de medidas de liberalización de sus economías para aumentar el crecimiento potencial.
ConclusionesAunque en la actual crisis también hay deflación de activos, por fortuna hay muchas diferencias que alejan el caso japonés del escenario central, aunque el riesgo sigue existiendo. La principal es que al ser una crisis de activos, el desplome de los mercados, especialmente de las bolsas, ha hecho que la sociedad sea consciente de la gravedad de la crisis y ha favorecida la acción de los Gobiernos.
Las primeras medidas han sido apuntalar el sistema financiero y recapitalizar a los bancos más afectados, pero ahora ha llegado la hora de la política fiscal. En las últimas décadas el paradigma liberal del minimalismo público «menos estado es más» ha primado la rebaja de impuestos. A partir de ahora, la incertidumbre es máxima y la bajada de impuestos puede ser destinada por las familias al ahorro, por lo que replicaríamos la trampa de la liquidez keynesiana que ha asolado Japón.
El gasto público tiene un efecto multiplicador y acaba arras-trando al sector privado al reactivar el empleo y las rentas salariales. Lo relevante es tener presente que el Estado no puede suplantar al sector privado permanentemente y que debe priorizar el gasto en infraestructuras. El anuncio de fuertes emisiones de deuda pública mundial ha provocado un aumento de las pendientes de las curvas de tipos, lo cual nos aleja del caso japonés. Sin duda, una gran noticia.
En el gráfico 2 se puede observar cómo el sector público tardó varios años en implementar políticas fiscales expansivas y cuando lo hizo fue ineficaz, al no priorizar el gasto en infraestructuras y acompañarlo de medidas de liberalización de sus economías para aumentar el crecimiento potencial.
ConclusionesAunque en la actual crisis también hay deflación de activos, por fortuna hay muchas diferencias que alejan el caso japonés del escenario central, aunque el riesgo sigue existiendo. La principal es que al ser una crisis de activos, el desplome de los mercados, especialmente de las bolsas, ha hecho que la sociedad sea consciente de la gravedad de la crisis y ha favorecida la acción de los Gobiernos.
Las primeras medidas han sido apuntalar el sistema financiero y recapitalizar a los bancos más afectados, pero ahora ha llegado la hora de la política fiscal. En las últimas décadas el paradigma liberal del minimalismo público «menos estado es más» ha primado la rebaja de impuestos. A partir de ahora, la incertidumbre es máxima y la bajada de impuestos puede ser destinada por las familias al ahorro, por lo que replicaríamos la trampa de la liquidez keynesiana que ha asolado Japón.
El gasto público tiene un efecto multiplicador y acaba arras-trando al sector privado al reactivar el empleo y las rentas salariales. Lo relevante es tener presente que el Estado no puede suplantar al sector privado permanentemente y que debe priorizar el gasto en infraestructuras. El anuncio de fuertes emisiones de deuda pública mundial ha provocado un aumento de las pendientes de las curvas de tipos, lo cual nos aleja del caso japonés. Sin duda, una gran noticia.
miércoles, 22 de octubre de 2008
Santander writes a new chapter as it emerges as banking predator
By Victor Mallet
Published: October 21 2008 03:00 Last updated: October 21 2008 03:00
Emilio Botín, chairman of Santander and the third person of that name to head the Spanish bank since it was founded in 1857, makes the art of banking sound deceptively simple even in the midst of a global financial crisis.
The world's banks, Mr Botín said last week, needed to focus on customers, make the most of recurrent business, manage risks prudently and reinforce corporate governance.
Under Mr Botín, now 74, Santander has expanded rapidly in Europe and the Americas over the past two decades. Yet envious executives at rival banks are asking whether Mr Botín, for all his sermons, has overreached himself with his latest round of acquisitions.
Merrill Lynch yesterday listed Santander as one of the big European banks that might need to raise more capital.
Shares in Santander, the biggest bank in the eurozone by market capitalisation, have been pummelled along with those of other banks during the crisis.
Santander, however, has emerged not only as a survivor but as a predator exploiting the credit crunch to purchase weaker banks.
José Antonio Alvarez, chief financial officer, said recently that Santander could benefit from a "winner takes all" market in the crisis "by rescuing falling banks at attractive prices".
Five days later, Santander announced a $1.9bn deal to buy Sovereign Bancorp of the US.
Earlier, Mr Botín had boasted to shareholders: "We are really in a magnificent position compared with our competitors."
Having bought Abbey National, Alliance & Leicester and the deposits and branches of the nationalised Bradford & Bingley, Santander is now a force in British retail banking as well as in Spain and Latin America.
Santiago López Díaz, an analyst for Credit Suisse, says the crisis has given Santander the chance to make acquisitions far more cheaply than in its dozens of previous deals.
"Right now Santander, in relative terms, is in a much better position than most of the European banks," he says.
Santander has succeeded with the help of a lot of skill and a little luck.
As Mr Botín likes to remind his listeners, risk control requires hard work, not fancy innovations.
Five directors on Santander's risk management committee meet twice a week for at least four hours. The bank's good fortune in this crisis is in its focus on retail rather than investment banking, and in the Bank of Spain's determined opposition as national regulator to the off-balance-sheet assets that turned toxic and sank banks elsewhere.
That still leaves Santander, which aims to increase net profit this year by 10 per cent to €10bn ($13.3bn), exposed to any weakness in key markets such as the UK, Spain and Latin America, and to the wholesale financing drought that is affecting the entire international banking system.
Even in these areas, however, analysts believe the risks are limited.
In Spain, for example, property developers, the borrowers most exposed to the country's residential property crash, account for only 6.8 per cent of Santander's portfolio of well provisioned Spanish assets.
Santander is a heavy user of wholesale finance - it needs more than a quarter of the €80bn that matures and needs refinancing for Spanish banks next year, according to one market analyst - but it has industrial assets to sell if needed.
Its senior executives, furthermore, helped persuade José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Socialist prime minister, to promise up to €150bn in asset purchases and state guarantees to keep the country's banks liquid up to the end of 2009.
"We feel comfortable with their [Santander's] liquidity position," says Maria Cabanyes of Moody's, the credit rating agency.
One concern is that Santander might have extended too much capital on acquisitions, leaving it vulnerable in a world populated by rival banks that have received emergency capital injections from their respective governments.
The latest deals, however, have only a small impact on Santander's core capital ratio - a reduction of 20 basis points in the case of the Sovereign deal - and senior executives say they will be devoting their time to consolidating what they have bought and rebuilding core capital from just under 6 per cent now to over 7 per cent at the end of next year.
Thereafter, the chances are that Santander, once an obscure provincial bank, will set out again on the global acquisition trail under Mr Botín or his successors.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
Published: October 21 2008 03:00 Last updated: October 21 2008 03:00
Emilio Botín, chairman of Santander and the third person of that name to head the Spanish bank since it was founded in 1857, makes the art of banking sound deceptively simple even in the midst of a global financial crisis.
The world's banks, Mr Botín said last week, needed to focus on customers, make the most of recurrent business, manage risks prudently and reinforce corporate governance.
Under Mr Botín, now 74, Santander has expanded rapidly in Europe and the Americas over the past two decades. Yet envious executives at rival banks are asking whether Mr Botín, for all his sermons, has overreached himself with his latest round of acquisitions.
Merrill Lynch yesterday listed Santander as one of the big European banks that might need to raise more capital.
Shares in Santander, the biggest bank in the eurozone by market capitalisation, have been pummelled along with those of other banks during the crisis.
Santander, however, has emerged not only as a survivor but as a predator exploiting the credit crunch to purchase weaker banks.
José Antonio Alvarez, chief financial officer, said recently that Santander could benefit from a "winner takes all" market in the crisis "by rescuing falling banks at attractive prices".
Five days later, Santander announced a $1.9bn deal to buy Sovereign Bancorp of the US.
Earlier, Mr Botín had boasted to shareholders: "We are really in a magnificent position compared with our competitors."
Having bought Abbey National, Alliance & Leicester and the deposits and branches of the nationalised Bradford & Bingley, Santander is now a force in British retail banking as well as in Spain and Latin America.
Santiago López Díaz, an analyst for Credit Suisse, says the crisis has given Santander the chance to make acquisitions far more cheaply than in its dozens of previous deals.
"Right now Santander, in relative terms, is in a much better position than most of the European banks," he says.
Santander has succeeded with the help of a lot of skill and a little luck.
As Mr Botín likes to remind his listeners, risk control requires hard work, not fancy innovations.
Five directors on Santander's risk management committee meet twice a week for at least four hours. The bank's good fortune in this crisis is in its focus on retail rather than investment banking, and in the Bank of Spain's determined opposition as national regulator to the off-balance-sheet assets that turned toxic and sank banks elsewhere.
That still leaves Santander, which aims to increase net profit this year by 10 per cent to €10bn ($13.3bn), exposed to any weakness in key markets such as the UK, Spain and Latin America, and to the wholesale financing drought that is affecting the entire international banking system.
Even in these areas, however, analysts believe the risks are limited.
In Spain, for example, property developers, the borrowers most exposed to the country's residential property crash, account for only 6.8 per cent of Santander's portfolio of well provisioned Spanish assets.
Santander is a heavy user of wholesale finance - it needs more than a quarter of the €80bn that matures and needs refinancing for Spanish banks next year, according to one market analyst - but it has industrial assets to sell if needed.
Its senior executives, furthermore, helped persuade José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Socialist prime minister, to promise up to €150bn in asset purchases and state guarantees to keep the country's banks liquid up to the end of 2009.
"We feel comfortable with their [Santander's] liquidity position," says Maria Cabanyes of Moody's, the credit rating agency.
One concern is that Santander might have extended too much capital on acquisitions, leaving it vulnerable in a world populated by rival banks that have received emergency capital injections from their respective governments.
The latest deals, however, have only a small impact on Santander's core capital ratio - a reduction of 20 basis points in the case of the Sovereign deal - and senior executives say they will be devoting their time to consolidating what they have bought and rebuilding core capital from just under 6 per cent now to over 7 per cent at the end of next year.
Thereafter, the chances are that Santander, once an obscure provincial bank, will set out again on the global acquisition trail under Mr Botín or his successors.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
martes, 21 de octubre de 2008
Are we in danger of turning Japanese?
Japan's stock market lost more than three quarters of its capital over two decades - it might be enough to bring tears to the eyes of even the most inscrutable investor.
'Pushing on a string'' might sound like a daft if harmless activity but I fear it will be seriously bad news for all of us if the phrase ever enters mainstream usage.
Devotees of the dismal science of economics use it to describe the point at which interest rate cuts and other attempts to boost activity - such as pumping billions into bust banks - fail to restore confidence.
For a Chancellor or Prime Minister to discover he is pushing on a string is akin to a sailor being blown onto a leeward shore and, seeing he is running out of sea room, discovering that the auxiliary engine will not start.
I first heard the phrase nearly 20 years ago when the Japanese stock market began its long decline from a peak of 38,000 in the Nikkei index, despite a series of increasingly desperate rate cuts. It came to mind again this week when the Tokyo market fell by another 11pc overnight to stand below 8,500 on Thursday. Losing more than three quarters of your capital over two decades might be enough to bring tears to the eyes of even the most inscrutable investor.
While we should always take a long-term view of equity-based investment, there is a limit to what human flesh can bear - or, as the economist John Maynard Keynes put it: "The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.''
Here and now, the Japanese experience is a terrifying reminder that some stock market sagas do not have a happy ending - as I pointed out in this newspaper in August, 2007, when the credit crunch began to bite.
Again, in an article headed "Western banks sink in the shadow of the rising sun'' in March this year, I wrote: "First there was Northern Rock in Newcastle; now there is Bear Stearns in New York. With banks being bailed out by taxpayers on both sides of the Atlantic, no wonder investors have that sinking feeling.
"While government intervention has prevented either bank going bust, it might be dangerously complacent to underestimate the seriousness of the global credit crisis. At worst, we could be looking at a repeat of what happened in Japan 19 years ago. Then, as now, banks got into trouble with rash lending against what proved to be grossly inflated property values.
"Before the bubble burst, the ground occupied by the Imperial Palace in Tokyo was valued at rather more than all the real estate in California and the shares on the Nikkei index were briefly priced at more than all those in America.
"Bearish analysts say the main reason that the market has failed to recover is that Japanese banks were propped up by government intervention, which allowed huge losses on bad debts to remain unrealised. International institutions were not fooled and the guilty banks have been unable to borrow - or lend - on normal terms since then.
"Once confidence has been destroyed it is very difficult to restore. Without confidence, there can be no credit - at any price.
"Nobody knows what share prices will do next week or next year. That does not matter for most pension savers who do not plan to retire next week or next year. History strongly suggests the best returns will be received by those who wait for the odds to work in their favour. Selling now will certainly turn paper losses into real ones.''
That is as true now as it was then. Unfortunately, it is also a fact that shares in London have lost about a third of their value since then.
No wonder more people are beginning to worry about parallels with the Land of the Rising Sun - and whether its past may foreshadow our future.
Devotees of the dismal science of economics use it to describe the point at which interest rate cuts and other attempts to boost activity - such as pumping billions into bust banks - fail to restore confidence.
For a Chancellor or Prime Minister to discover he is pushing on a string is akin to a sailor being blown onto a leeward shore and, seeing he is running out of sea room, discovering that the auxiliary engine will not start.
I first heard the phrase nearly 20 years ago when the Japanese stock market began its long decline from a peak of 38,000 in the Nikkei index, despite a series of increasingly desperate rate cuts. It came to mind again this week when the Tokyo market fell by another 11pc overnight to stand below 8,500 on Thursday. Losing more than three quarters of your capital over two decades might be enough to bring tears to the eyes of even the most inscrutable investor.
While we should always take a long-term view of equity-based investment, there is a limit to what human flesh can bear - or, as the economist John Maynard Keynes put it: "The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.''
Here and now, the Japanese experience is a terrifying reminder that some stock market sagas do not have a happy ending - as I pointed out in this newspaper in August, 2007, when the credit crunch began to bite.
Again, in an article headed "Western banks sink in the shadow of the rising sun'' in March this year, I wrote: "First there was Northern Rock in Newcastle; now there is Bear Stearns in New York. With banks being bailed out by taxpayers on both sides of the Atlantic, no wonder investors have that sinking feeling.
"While government intervention has prevented either bank going bust, it might be dangerously complacent to underestimate the seriousness of the global credit crisis. At worst, we could be looking at a repeat of what happened in Japan 19 years ago. Then, as now, banks got into trouble with rash lending against what proved to be grossly inflated property values.
"Before the bubble burst, the ground occupied by the Imperial Palace in Tokyo was valued at rather more than all the real estate in California and the shares on the Nikkei index were briefly priced at more than all those in America.
"Bearish analysts say the main reason that the market has failed to recover is that Japanese banks were propped up by government intervention, which allowed huge losses on bad debts to remain unrealised. International institutions were not fooled and the guilty banks have been unable to borrow - or lend - on normal terms since then.
"Once confidence has been destroyed it is very difficult to restore. Without confidence, there can be no credit - at any price.
"Nobody knows what share prices will do next week or next year. That does not matter for most pension savers who do not plan to retire next week or next year. History strongly suggests the best returns will be received by those who wait for the odds to work in their favour. Selling now will certainly turn paper losses into real ones.''
That is as true now as it was then. Unfortunately, it is also a fact that shares in London have lost about a third of their value since then.
No wonder more people are beginning to worry about parallels with the Land of the Rising Sun - and whether its past may foreshadow our future.
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